



# HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN

## ANALYSES • CONTEXT • CONNECTIONS

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## Preventative diplomacy in the Eastern Africa Region

The significance of “prevention is better than cure” fits well in preventing violent conflicts in the Eastern African Region (EAR)<sup>1</sup>. This paper presents the need for preventative diplomacy in the EAR as a conflict prevention mechanism. It will first clarify preventative diplomacy, from definition to forms and elements. Second is a brief elaboration of the nature of conflicts in EAR and third is the importance of it. Fourth are lessons learnt in the previous application and the fifth is an indication of existing challenges. Sixth are the suggestions for enhancing effective preventative diplomacy in this region. The conclusion finishes with policy recommendations. The argument is, despite looming challenges and mounting conflicts in EAR, there are plenty opportunities for applying preventative diplomacy given its beauty of viability in the region and beyond.

Preventative diplomacy is an “action taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change” (Lund 1996, p.37). It is “actions to prevent disputes from arising...prevent existing disputes from escalating...to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (Ghali 2000, p.11). But it should address the root causes and be designated at the right stage of the conflict cycle.

Various forms of preventative diplomacy exist. These include: peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacetime diplomacy, crisis diplomacy, post-conflict peacebuilding, preventative development, preventative deployment, mediation, track I and track II diplomacy. Mediation is a process of assisted negotiations by third parties in order to transform conflict from hostility to cooperation. Track I diplomacy involves efforts by official representatives and the elites focusing on positive and negative incentives in the process of mediation using economic and political support. Track II uses unofficial representatives, non-governmental organisations, regional and local leaders and grassroots groups as actors and uses the methodology of back-channel discussions, educational programs, workshops and grassroots reconciliation, among others.

Preventative deployment is rightly under-girded in the philosophy of UN Preventative Deployment (UNPREDEP) through proactive measures premeditated to facilitate a political solution by avoiding or limiting violent conflict. Unlike peacekeeping, it does not support any political solution already reached. It can happen without a settlement reached. Peacekeeping entails a dynamic instrument developed to keep existing, promising, made peace through military and or civilian operations. Peacemaking incorporates measures undertaken to persuade belligerent parties to

cease hostilities and negotiate, among themselves or through third parties, for peaceful settlement. Peacetime diplomacy prevails where states co-exist in harmony of reciprocity, cooperation and communication. The application of these forms largely depends on the time and place, actors, situation, and goals.

Elements of preventative diplomacy include strategies and measures of building confidence; fact finding missions; early warning mechanisms to detect potential conflicts; conflict impact assessment systems; measures to promote democracy and human rights; preventative deployment of peacekeeping forces; establishment of demilitarised zones; and measures to monitor and restrain the trade in small arms. The philosophy under-girded here is the prevention of violent conflicts.

### **Nature of conflicts**

EAR is predominated by violent and non-violent conflicts, inter-group conflicts, inter and intra-state conflicts, genocide and ethnic based conflicts, highly organized crimes, border disputes, resource based conflicts as evidenced by pastoral conflicts and the geo-political conflict over the Nile Resource for instance, terrorism, piracy/ maritime insecurity, illegal trade, drugs, illegal trafficking of humans, arms and contraband, waste dumping, armed attacks and smuggling. One could be tempted to consider a deistic approach to manage them. But this shows the need for earlier interventions. Preventative diplomacy aims at three things (Bedjaoui, 2000): to prevent disputes arising between governments and minority parties within states; to prevent an existing dispute from being transformed into an open conflict; and if a conflict breaks of, to ensure that it spreads as little as possible. Critically, the conflict cycle shows that preventative diplomacy can and should be applied.

### **Lessons learnt**

History shows opportunities seized and missed. Touval gives a detailed case study of Yugoslavia. First, the international community must prioritize its targets with regard to any conflict. One way of doing that is ranking the importance of each goal. Second, the international community should avoid presenting vague, ambiguous or woolly goals. Define the expectations so as to avoid sticking to agreements with less specific proposals. Touval adds that economic threats and incentives are likely to be ineffective in cases of ethnic conflict. Even the question of applying sanctions needs serious analysis of its impact to the general populace and the intended goal. The international community should “refrain from reciting broad values and instead define in concrete terms what they expect from the disputants” (Touval 1996, p. 414). This may be difficult but not impossible. Generate international agreement on basic values than on specific proposals. Arguably, goals must be clear to be credible because group identity, historic grievances, and physical security issues tend to overshadow economic concerns in some situations.

Touval advises that we become extra-careful with ethnic conflicts for the participants tend to become fully committed to their positions very early on. He warns that early preventive interventions are “likely to be launched at a highly inauspicious moment after the parties have committed themselves to their goals, but before they have reached a hurting stalemate that might dispose them to rethink their policies” (p. 415). We must do the right thing at the right time. We should mind timing. Finally, nations are often unwilling to commit themselves, their resources, and their citizens to preventing foreign conflicts. This is true with US soldiers withdrawn from Somalia in the early nineties. Yet without such commitment, diplomatic threats and incentives lack force and credibility. This is both a lesson and a challenge.

### **Challenges in applying preventative diplomacy**

The application of preventative diplomacy has its own challenges. One is the disagreement over the practice and theory of preventative diplomacy. The operational meaning of preventative diplomacy has been a challenge over who, when and how

to do it. Lund (1996) briefly highlights a few. He sees a problem of generating political will while securing cooperation to assume preventative diplomacy. There is a difficulty of providing incentives for bureaucrats to undertake preventative efforts which may also be overestimated. He also sees the influence and actions of major powers in the international system who behaves according to their diverse interests as a challenge.

Several remote conflicts are perceived by the legislatures and the public to be outside the interests of citizens of major powers. But we know well that the Somalia conflict and piracy, the Darfur Crisis, the conflict in Sudan, the crisis with rebels in Eastern DR Congo, the 2007/8 Post Election Violence in Kenya, the Nile hydro-politics conflict, among other conflicts in EAR, do threaten the international peace and security. Divergent interests within the region, preponderance of conflict among member states and dynamism of conflict, are also a challenge in itself.

Strategies to counteract these challenges may include: increase awareness and conscientiousness of the public about the dangers and risks of any crises through the media and education; orient ambassadors, mission officers and other necessary staffs with early warning concepts, tools and framework of conflict analysis; publicize humanitarian, economic, physical costs and human loss from any possible inaction to a promising arising violent conflict. Stimulate collaborative local preventative projects and capacity building of regional and NGO organisations through funding and logistical support (Lund 1996, p. 167). Institutional reforms help deter recurrence of violent conflicts in the long run.

### **Enhancing effective preventative diplomacy**

Effective early warning systems using local networks of educational institutions, civil society, and non-governmental organisations to monitor day-to-day changes since they are familiar with the context they are working is vital (Massimo, 2003). Establish and reinforce mechanisms to detect early-warning signs and keep an eye on specific indicators that may help to foresee imminent violence. We better ask ourselves: What are the implications to peace and security in the region for apprehending Omar Barshir to the ICC? What are the implications of not supporting the South Sudan referendum for secession? What is the implication of not adding more troops in Somalia? Should we ignore the failing Eritrea?

Diverse actors, issues and interests in the EAR call for an integrated multilateral preventative diplomatic approach. Concerted effort in addressing violence in the region should be agreed upon for easier implementation. Involve the media, private sector, intergovernmental organisations, NGOs and governments in preventing violent conflicts in the region.

Conflict has underlining causes or permissive conditions (Brown, 1996). Structural, political, socio-economic, cultural and perceptive conditions could necessitate conflict. Conflict is inevitable. But destructive conflict always requires preventative measures. Triggers or proximate causes determine when and how conflict may turn violent. They can be rapid and unexpected changes and act as an ignition to conflict. Serious effort should be considered to the 2011 Referendum in Sudan, failing Eritrea, and Somalia. Triggers can be of mass factors such as structural, economic, and cultural factors which influence perception. Elite factors whereby the behaviour of specific leaders deliberately fuel conflict for their own interests, requires short term diplomatic interventions through reminding leaders that they are responsible for their utterances or decisions.

### **Conclusion and recommendations**

This paper explored the need for preventative diplomacy in EAR. It defined the concept, highlighted the nature of conflict, significance, challenges and lessons learnt in the application of preventive diplomacy. Evidently, “a stitch in time saves nine”. The earlier the reaction to an incipient conflict, the greater the opportunity is to reverse a

deteriorating situation (Fusato, 2003). The need for preventative diplomacy in EAR is evidenced by its necessity, relevance and effective option in the long run. Consider the following policy recommendations:

- Sudan: Involve the civil society in planning, implementation and evaluation of preventative diplomacy. Make sure the direct participation of all parties both in Darfur and in the referendum. IGAD and AU should have institutionalised mechanisms of preventing violent conflicts at regional, national, district and local level about the country.
- Eritrea: The international community should enhance human rights monitoring, reporting, and promotion and address issues of good governance in the country.
- Kenya: Embrace a human security framework of analysis to address root causes of conflict; continue with institutional reforms; incorporate traditional conflict management mechanism at grassroots level through engaging the civil society.
- Somalia: AU should speed up the request and deployment of more AMISOM troops. AMISOM should support TFG reconciliation efforts, and full implementation of TFG, the UN Security Council in collaboration with AU should impose air and sea blockade to disrupt the supplies to Al-Shaabab. Expand also the mandate of AMISOM to the protection of the civilian. Involve all parties to the crisis in Somalia.
- To AU, IGAD, EAC and International Conference of Great Lakes Region: Adopt a human security approach in addressing human insecurity through addressing structural violence and meeting human needs. Apply a multifaceted approach of preventative diplomacy through institutionalising credible, multilevel, and consistent early warning system at local, national, and regional level. Enhance collaborative mechanisms and strategies on policies and issues between and among regional blocs, AU, UN and the international community.

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1 We consider Eastern African Region as the geo-political space covered by Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), International Conference on Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and East African Community. The countries in EAR are: DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, Comoros and Tanzania.

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## NEWS AND EVENTS

### GENERAL

#### **Churches urged to intensify role**

The Church in Africa has been urged to intensify its role in peace-making on the continent. Delivering a key note speech at a September 21-23 pan-African Church organized seminar, "Overcoming violence and lasting peace in Africa" held in Nairobi, Kenya, the former deputy chairperson of the Commission for African Union, Mr. Patrick Mazimhaka urged the Church not to leave peace-making issue to politicians. On the contrary, the Church should incorporate the issue within its pastoral engagements, he stressed.

The Church must take an effort to identify sources of frustrations for individuals, added Mr. Mazimhaka and suggested that the Church must maintain high spiritual and moral standards among its leadership if it is to play its role as a guide and counsel to the community. It is very important to be effective, during and after conflicts occur, he added, stressing that, where the Church fails to this, like in Rwanda, my country, during the genocide, it gets irreparably damaged and its role as a comforter and conciliator is diminished. The seminar was organized by the All Africa Conference of Churches, AACC and brought together 100 participants from twenty African countries.

*Catholic Information Service of Africa (CISA)*

#### **UN and African Union launch joint task force on peace and security**

The United Nations and the African Union on 25 September launched a joint task force on peace and security as the two organizations continue to step up their cooperation in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding across the continent. The Joint Task Force, launched at UN Headquarters in New York by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and AU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping, will meet twice a year at the senior level to review immediate and long-term strategic issues. Mr. Ban and Mr. Ping noted in a press release that they were determined to strengthen existing cooperation between the two organizations beyond the "ground-breaking joint efforts in Sudan, Guinea and Somalia."

A joint peacekeeping force has operated in Sudan's Darfur region (known as UN-AMID) since the start of 2008, while the UN provides support to the troops of the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Mr. Ban and Mr. Ping approved terms of reference for the new task force, which will conduct its first consultations on Tuesday, 5 October in New York, coinciding with this year being declared by the AU as the Year of Peace and Security in Africa. The task force's programme of work will be mapped out in coordination with the newly established UN Office to the AU and the AU's Permanent Observer Mission to the UN.

*UN News Service*

## ETHIOPIA

### **Western Ethiopia's Gambella region faces risks head-on**

Officials in Ethiopia's western Gambella region have scored conflict and erratic rainfall a dead certainty this year, potentially affecting more than 150,000 people. Gambella's conflict risk is heightened as its neighbour Southern Sudan approaches a January 2011 independence referendum. Associated internal instability and resource-related tensions in Sudan's South have already spilled over into Ethiopia. In 2009, a large group of Sudanese Lou Nuer crossed into Ethiopia following clashes with another Sudanese group, the Murle. The regional government says some 38,000 Ethiopians are still displaced. Apart from the problems imported from Sudan, recurrent internal clashes over land, natural resources or vendettas among and between local agro-pastoralist Nuer and mainly agrarian Anuak communities have, at least temporarily, displaced some 40,000 people.

At a political level, inter-community tensions in the region are exacerbated by their relationship to the national political dynamic. According to the 2007 census, the Nuer make up 46 percent of the region's population, more than double the 21 percent recorded for the Anuak. A significant slice of the remaining population is not indigenous to the area and known as "highlanders" - regardless of where they come from in Ethiopia. Tensions over access to political and economic influence have erupted before, as in late 2003 when government security forces cracked down after Anuak armed groups clashed with highlanders, leading to allegations of human rights abuses and arbitrary killings. These tensions, analysts say, could re-ignite. Most recently, the reappointment of the Anuak regional president and chairperson of the multi-ethnic ruling party in the region failed to address Nuer political aspirations, according to some observers.

The possibility of Southern Sudan's January referendum provoking new conflict and instability across the border is regarded nervously. The area hosted over 200,000 Sudanese refugees displaced in the 1980s by the civil war. Many left soon after the Ethiopian regime of Mengistu Hailemariam, a supporter of the Southern Sudanese movement, which took advantage of the camps for recruitment and training, was overthrown in 1991. Only some 26,000 Sudanese refugees remain in Ethiopia, according to the UN Refugee Agency.

*IRIN*

### **ONLF in Somaliland**

A senior government minister of Somaliland on 13 September admitted that a group of militia fighting against the Ethiopian government have secretly landed along Somaliland shores.

Somaliland Interior Minister Dr. Mohamed Abdi Gabose told a press conference in the regional capital Hargeisa that authorities have information that two boats unloaded "around 200 heavily-armed men in Zeila", an ancient coastal town in north-western Somalia and currently governed by Somaliland. Dr. Gabose said the rebels are "suspected to be members of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF),

but we are not certain.” He indicated that three trucks transported the 200 rebels to the remote hilly region where the international borders of Somalia, Djibouti and Ethiopia intersect.

ONLF is an ethnic Somali armed group that has been fighting against successive Ethiopian governments for the self-determination of Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia since 1984. “Our security forces are searching the area, supported by Ethiopian and Djibouti army units,” said the interior minister. The ONLF have not released any public statement regarding this new development, but it is the first time that Somaliland authorities have admitted that ONLF rebels operate in areas under their control.

*Garowe online*

## KENYA

### **Ex-soldiers confess role in Kenya in violence**

New evidence on how Kenya’s post-election violence was planned, funded and executed has been revealed. The International Criminal Court (ICC) says the information was supplied by former soldiers who trained youths who caused the mayhem in various parts of the country. The witnesses had not given their testimony to the Waki commission which investigated the post – election violence for fear of their security. But they had spoken out after being assured that the court with its seat in The Hague would protect them.

On 5 September, the official working closely with The Hague on the investigations said more key witnesses who had agreed to co-operate included chiefs and their assistants from areas affected by the violence. The Hague has signalled its determination to carry out intensive investigations and conclude them by the end of the year. On 3 September, the government signed an agreement that allows the court to set up an office to coordinate its activities with its staff enjoying the privileges and immunity enjoyed by diplomats. The deal also includes victim and witness protection and logistical support for ICC operations.

*Daily Nation on the web*

### **Mt Elgon survivors testify**

Survivors of past injustices in Mt. Elgon were urged to testify so that the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) could make a comprehensive report. The commission’s chief executive, Mrs Patricia Nyaundi, said many victims were reluctant to testify. Speaking at Cheptais on 3 September, Mrs Nyaundi said statement takers will spend two weeks in the area. She encouraged women to testify because they suffered the worst abuses. “All that was reported were the burnt houses and displaced people but nothing was mentioned of the women who were raped,” she said. Mrs Nyaundi claimed more than 5,000 women and girls were raped. She said the commission had five months to take statements before the start of public hearings in January next year. However, many residents asked to be taken to safe houses before giving statements. The victims claimed they were being threatened by those who allegedly committed atrocities against them. “We are aware of spies among us. Some of them are former SLDF members,” said a survivor who sought anonymity.

*Daily Nation on the web*

## SOMALIA

### **Ahlu Sunna no longer part of government**

The Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca militia group that signed a power sharing deal with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in March this year which included

a military unification agreement has withdrawn from the administration, according to the group spokesman, Sheikh Abdullahi Sheikh Abu Yusuf. On 26 September he accused the government of failure to meet certain agreements reached when they agreed a power-sharing deal. The spokesman noted that the TFG failed to fulfil the agreement that the two parties signed in Addis Ababa. He added that ‘helping to built new government through the new draft constitution was not their mission’. The group exists primarily in central Somalia, where it has managed to maintain control over large swaths of territory, predominantly in Galgadud and Hiran regions.

*Garowe online*

### **Somaliland and Puntland to cooperate on security**

Somaliland and Puntland have agreed in principle to work together to tackle common security threats. Troops from both regions have clashed over disputed borderlands in the past. They also differ over the issue of sovereignty: Somaliland unilaterally declared independence in 1991, and Puntland, while asserting a degree of autonomy, recognizes Mogadishu as its own, and Somaliland’s, capital. “You can’t choose your neighbours, whether it is a region or state; for this reason, from now on, we are going to work with the Puntland state of Somalia, in terms of security of the (Horn of Africa) region,” Somaliland’s Interior Minister, Mohamed Abdi Gabose, said on 28 September in the Somaliland capital, Hargeisa.

Puntland Information Minister Abdihakim Ahmed Guled welcomed the openness of the new government in Somaliland and its aim to solve the problems in peace and negotiations. Meanwhile, there have been international moves to increase engagement with both Somaliland and Puntland, most notably by the United States, which plans to send more diplomats and aid workers there. The US has stressed, however, that this initiative does not mark the beginning of a process to recognize Somaliland’s independence.

*IRIN*

## **SUDAN**

### **Sudan government earmarks funds to fight LRA**

The Southern Sudanese Parliament has allocated five million Sudanese pounds (\$2 million) to provide local community militia groups also known as “Arrow Boys” with weapons to fight the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The announcement was made on 28 September. The money will be used to supply the groups with guns, communication systems and training. The groups will be trained and will be expected to maintain close contact with the south’s military that also constitutes former rebel fighters of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). The ‘Arrow Boys’ armed with machetes, spears and clubs have been protecting rural communities against regular attacks from LRA fighters. The Southern Sudanese army is overwhelmed by the vast jungle region leaving some of these communities barely protected. After Operation Lightning Thunder, the LRA took refuge in the dense forests of south Sudan, north-eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). It is believed that some 400 LRA fighters are operating in 10 different groups in these three countries.

*The Monitor*

### **North Sudan’s ruling party threatens to reject results**

North Sudan’s ruling party on 27 September again threatened to reject the results of the southern independence referendum unless the south withdrew its troops from disputed areas and allowed free campaigning in the vote. Southerners are just over 100 days away from a vote on whether to stay part of Sudan or declare independence.

Coming so close to the scheduled referendum date, the statement by a minister from President Omar Hassan al-Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP) will dismay observers already worried Sudan is running out of time to stage the vote. The minister accused the south's army of straying out of areas assigned to them in the peace accord, and said southern authorities were cracking down on supporters of Sudanese unity. "There is no freedom of (speech) in the south or for any movement to speak out for unity. Many people have been arrested and some of them were even killed," Haj Majid Suwar, Sudan's youth and sports minister and a senior NCP member, told reporters. Asked what the NCP would do if the southerners did not allow open campaigning and move their troops, he answered: "Maybe we will talk to ... the USA and the U.N. and the AU (African Union) and say that the other side, they didn't fulfil the CPA, so we may not recognise the results."

*Reuters*

## UGANDA

### Uganda and DRC in discussions over the LRA

Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have vowed to work together to annihilate the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels who are threatening the security of the two countries. Defence minister Dr. Crispus Kiyonga and DRC's defence and veterans' minister Charles Mwando made the declaration after a meeting in Munyonyo on 19 September. The ministers met under the Ngurdoto agreement signed by President Yoweri Museveni and Joseph Kabila in Tanzania on September 8, 2007. According to a statement, the ministers reviewed the security situation along the border and commended each other for the joint operations against the LRA rebels in the DR Congo. They also thanked each other for the on-going operations against the Alliance Defence Forces (ADF) leaders in Eastern DRC. "In this respect, they agreed to do everything possible to neutralise Joseph Kony, his group, and the ADF rebels," the statement said. Uganda offered training space at its military academies to DRC forces.

*The New Vision.*

## RESOURCES

### GENERAL

#### **"Enhancing civilian protection in peace operations: insights from Africa" (September 2010)**

Although difficult, civilian protection can be enhanced if peace operation policies are based on a multi-layered conception of protection, a sound analysis of the conflict dynamics in question, a clear view of the strategy guiding protection activities, and peacekeepers supplied with sufficient resources to undertake the crucial operational and tactical tasks. The most strategic long-term challenge is determining how to effectively *deter* attacks on civilians. The research results are based on research conducted in the DRC, Rwanda and Sudan. The research paper is written by Paul D. Williams of the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS)

<http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/ACSS-Research-Paper-1.pdf>

#### **"Political missions, mediation and good offices" (September 2010)**

Mediation and good offices are variously employed in support of national peace processes underway, to help initiate new ones, in response to sudden political crises, or

to help prevent or avert conflicts that threaten. Most commonly undertaken by high profile mediators or envoys engaged on behalf of the UN Secretary-General, a regional organization, an individual state, or even a non-governmental actor, mediation and good offices also represent core functions of special political missions. Fulfilling them is not without its challenges. Some functions relate to the intrinsic complexity of the conflicts or situations with which political missions engage. Others reflect the limitations of their mandate and resources, sensitivities surrounding national sovereignty, varying degrees of support or pressure from external actors, and questions regarding the integration of each mission's activities with those of other international actors.  
[www.cic.nyu.edu/Lead%20Page%20PDF/whitfield\\_politicalmissions.pdf](http://www.cic.nyu.edu/Lead%20Page%20PDF/whitfield_politicalmissions.pdf)

## ERITREA

### **“Eritrea and the Al-shabaab” (August 2010)**

Eritrea and Ethiopia are neighbours on the Horn of Africa. They share common languages, ethnicities, ethnic structures and religious traditions. By outward appearances, they should co-exist symbiotically, like Canada and the United States. Instead, they resemble the Koreas – each at the other's throat with no prospect for reconciliation on the horizon. Eritrean political culture over the past fifty years has spawned a national psyche consumed with fear and hatred of all things Ethiopian. That same culture has isolated Eritrea from the African Union (AU), the UN and the United States, and has driven the country into alignment with destabilizing regional forces for which it has no pre-ordained cultural affinity. Principal among Eritrea's unlikely allies is Al Shabaab, the al Qaeda-affiliated militia prosecuting the armed opposition in Somalia. This article reviews the genesis of this strange alliance and explores potential military solutions  
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/516-Heintz.pdf>

### **“The siege state” (September 2010)**

The report by the International Crisis Group suggests ways to avert what it considers as a potential threat to peace and security in the Horn of Africa. It proposes for countries to engage effectively with the government of Eritrea among other recommendations.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/ethiopia-eritrea/163%20Eritrea%20The%20Siege%20State.ashx>

## KENYA

### **“A breakthrough in justice? Accountability for post-election violence in Kenya” (August 2010)**

Following the passage of several deadlines set by the ICC prosecutor for Kenya to establish such a body, the OTP sought the opening of an investigation, which the judges of Pre-Trial Chamber II approved on 31 March 2010. While the engagement of the ICC with Kenya is in its early stages, the time is ripe for an initial assessment of its efficacy in promoting accountability in Kenya, and implications for future engagements. The policy paper is written by the Centre on Human Rights in Conflict.

<http://www.uel.ac.uk/chrc/documents/TheICCandKenyaPolicyPaper2010.pdf>

### **“Internal displacement and local peacebuilding in Kenya: challenges and innovations” (September 2010)**

Peacebuilding after the 2007–08 post-election violence in Kenya is inextricably linked to the challenges of dealing with the hundreds of thousands of people that the violence internally displaced- a problem recognized in the national accord drawn up after the violence occurred. Effective resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and reconciliation should be a key indicator of successful peacebuilding, which in turn

requires appropriate monitoring and evaluation of resettlement, reconciliation, and compensation efforts. Currently, non-governmental peacebuilding organizations continue to be urban and centred in Nairobi, focusing on sporadic small projects, youth exchanges, and workshops. They rarely tap into informal or formal networks of local people and institutions, and no rigorous monitoring and reporting of previous hot spots of violence occur in an institutionalized and continuous manner.

*<http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR251%20-%20Peace%20building%20in%20Kenya.pdf>*

## SUDAN

### **“Civil society in Darfur” (September 2010)**

This report originated from both the belief that civil society must be involved if a lasting solution to the Darfur conflict is to be found and the recognition that, outside specialized sectors, little is known about Darfur civil society. In defining the categories of civil society in the Darfur context, the report explores civil society’s role in the greater peace process, examines mediators’ efforts to harness civil society to date, and argues that civil society could be extremely useful to the peacemaking process, but only if its representatives to the process are carefully selected and properly involved in the process. The United States Institute of Peace worked closely with the authors Theodore Murphy and Jérôme Tubiana in the conception of this report.

*<http://www.usip.org/files/resources/Civil%20Society%20in%20Darfur%20-%20Sept.%202010.pdf>*

### **“Local justice in Southern Sudan” (September 2010)**

This study is the result of collaboration between the United States Institute of Peace and the Rift Valley Institute (RVI), leveraging the former’s broader work on customary justice and legal pluralism and the latter’s extensive knowledge of the region. The overall concept and methodology was developed jointly by Cherry Leonardi of Durham University, Deborah Isser of USIP, and John Ryle of RVI. Dr. Leonardi was also director of the research team and lead author of the report, and she conducted field work in Wau and Jur River Counties. Dr. Leben Moro and Martina Santschi led the research in Kajokeji County and Aweil East County, respectively.

*<http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PW66%20-%20Local%20Justice%20in%20Southern%20Sudan.pdf>*

### **“More than a thin line: Sudan’s North – South border” (September 2010)**

This report is not primarily about demarcation of the North-South border. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement sets out a mechanism for delineating and demarcating this line. Instead, the report asks what impact national and local issues relating to the border are having, or could have, for communities living near it and for the wider peace in Sudan. In responding to this central question, much of the report outlines perceptions described by populations at the border. These determine human response even if they do not necessarily reflect objective realities. It follows that in reporting perceptions of diverse Sudanese groups and individuals. The report hopes it will contribute to a greater understanding of the role border-related dynamics play in driving conflict in the region and that it will assist in the generation of policies and programmes that will be effective in establishing lasting peace between the people of the North and the South of Sudan and, more particularly, among the communities who live, work and move close to and across the border. It was commissioned by the United States Institute of Peace and produced by Concordis International.

*[http://www.concordis-international.org/files/pdfs/2010\\_More-than-a-line\\_Sudan\\_Report.pdf](http://www.concordis-international.org/files/pdfs/2010_More-than-a-line_Sudan_Report.pdf)*

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### Editorial information

The media review Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) was published by the Life & Peace Institute between 1989 and 2006. The re-formatting of HAB as an e-bulletin 2007 is done in close collaboration with the Nairobi-based All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). The electronic base of HAB is LPI and the editor is Olivia Kibui, [olivia.kibui@life-peace.org](mailto:olivia.kibui@life-peace.org). For subscription matters contact: Tore Samuelsson, [tore.samuelsson@life-peace.org](mailto:tore.samuelsson@life-peace.org). For a link to HAB and more information see [www.life-peace.org](http://www.life-peace.org)

### Editorial principles

The Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) is an international newsletter, compiling analyses, news and resources primarily in the Horn of Africa region. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily represent the views of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) or the cooperating partners, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). Writers and sources are normally referred to, although in exceptional cases, the editors of the HAB may choose not to reveal the real identity of a writer or publish the source.

