



HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN

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Exploring the dimension of cultural violence in conflicts in the Horn of Africa – the cases of Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan

Introduction

The post-independence political history of the Horn of Africa countries of Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan has been characterised by various forms of conflicts. Most analyses of these conflicts have been premised on international relations, political science and anthropology perspectives. Some of these analyses have focused on the causes of the conflicts while others have focused on the role of leadership. There have also been analyses on the regional dimensions and cross-border links of these conflicts. However, there has been little focus on cross-cutting single themes such as cultural violence. Yet, it is important that conflict resolution initiatives understand and address the cultural violence dimension of these conflicts. This article aims to explore the cultural violence dimension of conflicts in these three countries. In the context of this article, the concept of cultural violence will be viewed from a peace and conflict studies perspective.

Besides being in the same geographical zone, Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan have further similarities. They are predominantly Muslim; they have experienced armed conflicts; they have sought to resolve these conflicts through peace negotiations; and their peace agreements proposed power-sharing. However, they also have differences such as wide berth in geographical size, huge population differences and different ethnic compositions, and they have followed divergent post-peace agreement trajectories.

Theoretical framework

The analysis of the cultural violence dimension in Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan is informed by Johan Galtung's theory of violence. Galtung's theory identifies three forms of violence: direct, structural and cultural. Direct violence is the physical violence. It is visible as it causes injuries, death and destruction. Structural violence is related to the existence of policies, institutional frameworks and structures that do not allow people to satisfy their basic needs. Such structures

include poverty, economic inequalities and political marginalisation. Galtung defines cultural violence as “those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical and formal science” that legitimise or justify warfare or structures of exploitation and marginalisation. In other words, cultural violence refers to the social, cultural and political values that are used to legitimise physical and structural violence. Unlike physical violence, both structural and cultural violence are not visible. Galtung explores the relationship between direct, structural and cultural violence using the violence triangle.



Source: Polylog: Forum for Intercultural Philosophy. Available online at <http://them.polylog.org/5/fgj-en.htm>

Galtung contends that both direct and structural violence are not possible without cultural violence. Thus, cultural violence justifies or reinforces structural and direct violence.

The dimension of cultural violence in Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan

a) Djibouti

Djibouti is one of the smallest countries in Africa with a land area of 23,000 km². The 2008 World Population data sheet lists the population of Djibouti as 800,000. Despite its small size and population, Djibouti is an ethnically heterogeneous country. The two largest groups are the Issa and Afar (Danakil). The Issa comprise about 33% of the population and live in the Southern region. They are a sub-group of the bigger Somali Dir clan, speak a dialect of Somali and are Muslims. Two other Dir sub-groups, the Gadaboursi and Isaak, comprise 28% of the population. Both live mainly in the capital, Djibouti city. All together, the Somali groups constitute more than 60% of the population. The Afar make up 20% of the population and occupy the northern two-thirds of the country. They speak their own language and are also Muslims. However, their version of Islam incorporates traditional beliefs that are not shared by the Somali groups.

George Kieh has observed that ethnicity is a powerful force in the politics of Djibouti. Indeed, ethno-cultural polarisation between the Afar minority and the Somali majority is quite deep and ethnicity plays a central role in politics and state management. The history of Djibouti since independence from France in 1977 has been characterised by tensions and conflicts between the Issa and the Afar. These tensions date back to the French rule. In the 1960s, France supported the Afar ostensibly to counter the pan-Somali ideas that were propagated by Somalia. That pan-Somali ideology aimed at uniting all Somali-inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa including Djibouti to form the Greater Somalia. The Issa led the independence movement in the 1970s, while the Afar – fearing dominance by the more numerous Issa – preferred French rule. However, a unified political movement, the Ligue Populaire Africaine pour l'Indépendance (LPAI) – Popular African League for Independence –, led the country to independence in June 1977. In March 1979, the Issa-dominated government replaced LPAI with the Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès (RPP) – Popular

Rally for Progress Party. In 1981, a new law proclaimed Djibouti as a single party state with RPP as the only party. The Afar reacted to that by forming the clandestine opposition movement, the Front Democratique pour la Liberation de Djibouti (FDLD) – Democratic Front for the Liberation of Djibouti, which carried out a low scale rebellion.

Despite the symbolism of equality represented by the national coat of arms, Djibouti has been characterised by regional economic imbalances, and unequal access to political and economic power with the Issa dominating in the executive, the civil service, and the ruling party. That has put Djibouti under structural violence, which challenges the sustainability of peace. As stated above, structural violence is a situation where people are not facing physical violence, but they cannot satisfy their basic needs and interests because the established policies or the institutional framework does not allow them to do so. Underpinning this structural violence is cultural violence that has its roots in the politics and ideology of decolonisation. The ideological underpinnings of the Issa dominance have been that they led the independence movement, and are more populous, and thus they must dominate all positions of power, wealth and privilege. This ideology is, in essence, the cultural violence that justified Afar marginalisation and physical violence. The emergence of the Afar rebellion that started in 1981 when the Issa party, RPP, became the sole political party, has given rise to other aspects of cultural violence. This cultural violence and the structural violence that it underpins led to low scale direct violence that continued up to November 1991, when it erupted into openly armed insurrection led by the newly formed Front pour la Restauration de l'Unité et la Démocratie (FRUD) – Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy. The government responded to the FRUD-led rebellion by reforming the constitution so as to allow for phased transition to a multi-party political system. According to the new law, only four registered political parties would be allowed in the first ten years, and a full multi-party system would be adopted after 2002. FRUD was denied registration and therefore did not qualify under the new law to participate in the December 1992 elections.

Thus, the conflict continued until 1994 when the RPP government negotiated a peace agreement with a faction of FRUD. The peace agreement stipulated power-sharing between the Issa and Afar, recasting of the electoral rolls, devolution of authority and power and integration of former FRUD combatants into the Djibouti regular armed forces. The last FRUD faction signed a similar peace deal in 2001. The provisions of both peace agreements aimed at stopping direct violence, and mitigating structural violence through ethnic balancing in the executive and other political institutions, and, by implication, mitigating cultural violence. Indeed, as per the power-sharing provisions, the president of the republic is an Issa, the prime minister is an Afar and the cabinet is proportionally balanced. In March 2006, the country held its first regional elections and began implementing the decentralisation plan envisioned in the agreements. Though correcting the legacies of the regional social and economic imbalances will take a long time, mitigating both the structural and cultural violence through the two peace agreements has to a large extent contributed to peace and Djibouti is at the moment more stable than its neighbours.

b) Somalia

Unlike Djibouti, Somalia is culturally homogeneous and was once regarded as the only true nation-state in Africa. Despite that homogeneity, the state of Somalia collapsed in 1991 and the country has since been without a functioning central government, a formal economy, or an effective peace agreement. Over the last 18 years, most parts of Somalia have been in partial anarchy. The north-eastern

part seceded in 1991 to form the Republic of Somaliland while the north-east became Puntland State of Somalia in 1998. There are several interpretations of the conflict. The primordial interpretation, for instance, emphasises ancient or traditional hatreds between the various Somali clans. The instrumental interpretation focuses on the role of leadership and governance. Both schools seek to explain the prevalence of physical violence. According to Galtung's theory of violence, physical and structural violence are not possible without cultural violence. What then are the dimensions of cultural violence in Somalia?

In her anthropological works on Somalia, Catherine Besteman has argued that the conflict in Somalia is rooted in the political economy of class and regional dynamics, but the cultural construction of racial stratification configured the patterns of violence. Besteman adds that "cleavages in Somali society not only derive from clan, but more critically, draw upon shifting cultural constructions of difference such as race, language and status, and economic divisions such as occupation and class." In other words, direct violence in Somalia has been premised upon cultural violence that revolves around social class, occupation, race, status and language. It is this cultural violence that accounts for the worst violence of 1991-94, most of which occurred in the Jubba Valley.

Actually, according to General Mohammed Farah Aideed and Dr. Satya Pal Ruhela, "Somalis are divided into four major tribes, Hawiye (or Aujiya), Dir, Issaq and Daarod, and two settled people, Digil and Rahanwin... The last two of the Somali people are considered to be inferior tribes." Whereas Aideed sees some as 'inferior tribes', he describes his own clan group as "wealthy and powerful business people, intellectuals and capable elites." Not surprisingly, one of the armed groups in Somalia, the Rahawyen Resistance Army (RRA), was formed to counter Aideed's forces, which occupied the Jubba Valley in 1991-94, while Aideed himself died in battle in the valley in 1996. According to Besteman, this distinction between 'noble' and 'inferior' tribes, in other words cultural violence, has played a central role in the protracted conflict in Somalia particularly in the 1990s. In other words, unlike in Djibouti where cultural violence is rooted in the ideology of decolonisation and expresses itself along ethno-cultural lines, expressions of cultural violence in Somalia include the social construction of some groups as 'inferior' and others as 'noble'.

c) Sudan

Sudan experienced conflicts in several regions including the south and the western region of Darfur. This article will focus on the cultural dimension in the 1983-2005 north-south conflict. The conflict between 'north' and 'south' Sudan started as soon as Sudan attained independence in 1956. The first phase of the conflict is popularly known as Anya Nya I, and ended in 1972 when the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and the Government of Sudan signed a peace agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The second phase of the conflict started in 1983 when the Government of President Jaafar al-Nimeiry abrogated the 1972 Agreement. This phase ended in January 2005 when the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Government of Sudan signed a peace agreement in Nairobi, Kenya.

At the time of independence, Sudan, particularly the south, faced high levels of poverty, political marginalisation and severe economic underdevelopment. The country was, in essence, under acute structural violence. Also, Sudan faced a severe crisis of national identity. According to Francis Deng, "identities are a function of how individuals and groups identify themselves and are identified by others on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, language, culture or region."

This crisis of identity, or a contradiction of values, built a cultural violence that underpinned the long-running conflict. Deng attributes the crisis of identity 'to overlapping set of discrepancies'. The first one arose from the 'racial and cultural anomalies of Arabism'. Though some distinguish between racial and cultural dimensions of Arabism, the dominant northern Arab groups see themselves as Arabs in racial and cultural terms. The second discrepancy arises from the official perception of the state's identity as Arab and Islamic, in a country where majority of the population are not Arabs, and majority of the Muslims practice Africanised or indigenised versions of Islam.

In an essay, *Behold the New Sudan*, Alex de Waal argues that several visions have been competing in Sudan. There is the old vision that sees Sudan as an Arab and Muslim country. This vision's central emphasis is Arabism, and the Arab nationalism inherent in it was a key driver of the 1956-72 war. Another vision is represented by Hassan al-Turabi. It is a vision of Sudan as an Islamic state built around an Islamic society. The central pillar of this vision is Islamic identity. Alex de Waal avers that this vision sought to offer a progressive alternative to Arab nationalism because the majority Sudanese are Muslims but not Arabs. The propagation of this ideology in the course of the 1983-2005 war led to claims that the war was religious. Competing with these two is the vision of John Garang, who saw a Sudan of equality and non-discrimination, a Sudan where all the provinces—the margins of the South, west, east and north—enjoyed a fair share of power and resources. Garang's vision played a central role in the 2002-2005 peace negotiations in Kenya and informed the letter and the spirit of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

There is no doubt that each of these conflicting identities, or visions, has been underpinned by certain core values (or cultural violence) which, in turn, informed the perception towards the prevalent structural and physical violence. It is that cultural violence that led to the description of the north-south conflict in Sudan as a racial conflict between Arabs and African; a religious war between northern Muslims and southern Christians; or a cultural conflict between the Arab-Muslim cultures and African-black people cultures.

Conclusion

This article has explored the role of cultural violence in prolonging direct violence in the conflicts in Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan. The forms of cultural violence in each case have been determined by the country's unique political dynamics and ethnic compositions, and have led to different outcomes. In an ethnically heterogeneous Djibouti, cultural violence has been expressed along ethnic identity lines. In Somalia, cultural violence has been expressed through labelling some groups 'noble' and others 'inferior'. In Sudan, cultural violence has been expressed through racial, religious and political ideologies. Be that as it may, the conclusion is the same: for sustainable peace to be attained in Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan, conflict resolution interventions must devise mechanisms of mitigating cultural violence which has played a key role in perpetuating structural and direct violence in these three societies.

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Retrieving the baby from the birth waters: thoughts on the post-Djibouti quest for peace in Somalia

Introduction

Contrary to what most people believe, conflict is not inherently bad; conflict is a critical part of social transformation and change, restructuring the relationships not only between peoples, but also within their own groups. It is when latent conflicts escalate into violent confrontation and even get protracted that generalized and unnecessary suffering results. Like so many other internal wars worldwide, the Somali conflict contains elements of both: the Somali nation has been convulsed by nearly 18 years of violence leaving hundreds of thousands of people dead and millions of others either uprooted or displaced. This paper advances some thoughts on the future of Somalia. I argue that Somalis have now been offered a rare opportunity to redefine not only the type of government they want but also the kind of society they aspire to become – thus “retrieving the baby from the birth waters” aptly captures the would-be actions by the Somalis and where the ordinary Somali would wish to go. My hypothesis is that barring the mountainous diplomatic and political landscape, the baby can be retrieved albeit gradually. That there will be no “quick-fixes” here cannot be gainsaid.

Underlying causes of conflict and ways to deal with them

Here, I refer to the structural and underlying issues, which play host to the real causes of conflict. This section begins by outlining these very causes and then offers possible solutions for the conflict in Somalia. What constitutes the underlying causes in the Somali case? The confines of this article do not allow analysing the underlying causes exhaustively. Instead, I want to focus on two key issues: clannism and contract and force and feuds.

Clannism and contract

Clanship and contract form key principles in the constitution of Somali political units. On its own, clanship is utterly deficient in explaining political solidarity. In the same vein, contract or agreement does not suffice except in exceptional cases. This means that for a holistic understanding of the political institutions of the Somali, one must ensure these twin issues are analysed in a symbiotic manner or approach. Thus where agnatic kinsmen are parties to a political agreement, Somali speak of *tol xeer leh*, “agnates bound by treaty”. To understand how these two distinct principles interact and jointly contribute to the political solidarity of groups, it is first necessary to decipher the meaning of the word *xeer*. In everyday use, it is translated as ‘custom’, but it bears more specific connotations. Its closest equivalents in English are compact, contract, agreement or treaty in a bilateral sense. Thus several men or parties are said to be of the same *xeer* when their relations are regulated by an agreement, either directly and consciously entered into by them or accepted by legacy of their ancestors. Contractual obligations may be entailed by a prior agreement binding the ancestors of persons or groups. And agreements can be contracted into and contracted out of. As need may arise, the terms of contracts are abrogated, existing treaties modified or rescinded, and new agreements are made. The majority of *xeer* agreements binding groups relate principally to collective defence and security and to political cohesion in general. Clannism and trusted clan allies have been a major source of friction also within Transitional Federal Government (TFG) that was formed in October 2004 at Mbagathi, Kenya. As a basic cause, clannism stands out. The micro issues which emerge in the course of implementation shed light into clannism as an underlying cause. Though far from perfect, the Charter sets out basic rules for the transition, including the character, duties and powers of national institutions.

From a Somali perspective, it is analogous to a *xeer* – a form of contract in Somali customary law that is binding upon the clans and sub-clans whose representatives signed it.

Somalia's cycle of failed national reconciliation processes has become predictable: a foreign power hosts a "peace conference" punctuated by declarations of repentance, fraternity and nationalism. A transitional national authority, encumbered by dozens of ministries, eventually emerges. Though inclusiveness is proclaimed, a narrow political clique – usually identified with specific clan interests – manages to monopolise power and advance its own agenda. Meanwhile, a loose opportunistic opposition alliance coalesces and launches a political and military campaign to discredit the new government. The government angrily denounces the opposition as "spoilers", "criminals" and "terrorists" determined to derail the restoration of legitimate government. Foreign governments pick sides and provide limited financial and military hardware support to their proxies and violence escalates. Unable to exert authority at home, the leaders embark on extended travels to foreign capitals and international conferences, intended to muster international legitimacy and solicit foreign aid on the basis of being a "government in exile" denied their rightful place by the belligerents' insurgency. If and when the little aid arrives, only a very small portion is accounted for. In despair, with very little tangible impact, the entire enterprise unravels or the mandate expires. Even then the leaders seem to be in denial – a case of the proverbial ostrich burying its head in the sand. Incisive analysis reveals that the root cause of failure is insufficient support from the 'international community'. Soon, a friendly country steps in and the cycle is repeated.

To form a government that is truly national in unity and upholds the tenets of the transitional charter will be a gradual process. There are no quick fixes. Conflicts are not instant, which means the process of reversing the current state must, by and large, undergo the same phases, painstaking as it may be. This is not to say that the peace process must and will take a whole eighteen years. It simply means that the major phases in the evolution of the Somali conflict must be reversed with the right strategies in place. Though clannism has proven to be one of the major lines of confrontation, however, the regulatory elements of clanship and contract should be part of a sustainable rebuilding of a political order in Somalia. Without rewriting the Somali history, men and women must gather their forces and energies to stand up and help in regaining statehood. They must take a one-way ticket out of the clan's womb. This does not mean that clans should be wished away. Clans are a fact of Somali social life and can be used in order to promote positive political developments.

Force and feud

Somalis readily engage in battle to redress wrongs and injuries, to release pent-up enmities, to acquire or maintain honour, and to gain access to trading facilities, natural resources or to conserve their rights over them. In a society such as this, where fighting very largely determines the political status, feud and war are instruments of power politics – they are the chief means by which the relations between and among groups are regulated. For, ultimately even under modern administration, the rights of groups are effectively only protected through the use of force. In the form of collective vengeance, self-help is canalized by lineage affiliation and given structural definition through complementary principles of clanship and contract. With some exception only among the sedentary groups, outside and over and above dia-paying groups no impartial power except the administration which exists to control relations between lineages. It is plausible

to hypothesise that in the past lineages were in a position to fight each other to a stand-still whereas the presence of administrations now prevents this, yet at the same time hinders the full release of tension by limiting the opportunities for its dissipation. A lineage is answerable to all external actions of its members, and even after his death the kinsmen of the person responsible for a wrong are still held responsible for its settlement.

Somalia is that incredible entity: a nation with nationalism, but without a sufficiently strong sense of national identity to produce massive national commitment. It is like a family, which sometimes has a sense of family consciousness, especially if it is defending itself against a common external aggressor. At that point, a sense of family unity arises. Yet in daily life, they lack sufficient family cohesion. They quarrel and inflict pain upon each other. Even though the Somalis are in many ways interrelated: they look alike, they speak almost alike, and they understand one another's sensibilities, cohesiveness sorely lacks at critical moments. The Somalis ought to consolidate nationhood and tap the fountain of nationalism, not just for defensive purposes, not just for oratorical purposes, not just in moments of anger, but as sustained commitment.

Conclusion

President Sheikh Shariff Sheikh Ahmed has an onus task. In many ways his moderate stand in the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) may be a key in sketching a new architecture for peace in the war-ravaged country. Meanwhile the Al Shabaab with its cells in Mogadishu and other parts of the country and the Ras Kamboni group (which controls Kismayu region) must sit upright, clear the wool from their eyes and look back in a bid to look forward for the sake of the suffering masses. They must be encouraged to pick up the bits of shattered peace and embark on reconstruction. Political and diplomatic will must flow from all the actors and peripheral stakeholders. The international community needs to shake off the blame laid at their door step by former President Abdullahi Ahmed Yusuf and help drive the process.

This paper concludes with a simple message, namely that constructive relations among the stakeholders should be of the kind that respect and enhance Somalia's autonomy as a unitary state and empowerment. The leadership should promote self-esteem, institutionalize human dignity and entrench the values of integrity. They should champion the universality of Somali brotherhood (and sisterhood) and incentivize the creation of robust political institutions and arrangements that serve as effective bulwarks against bigotry, discrimination on clan basis, injustice, prejudice, disenfranchisement and other forms of chauvinistic exclusivism. I have attempted to make my position (thoughts) wide-ranging but clear. Yet, at the very end of this endeavor I return to the assertions of former President Thabo Mbeki about the underlying sources of Africa's predicament, the actions needed to redeem her and the painful options to be grappled with by the leaders to reclaim Africa's humanity. For, after all that is said and done, leaders should realize that the present world order is part of the problem, and not the solution, to Africa's conflict. Whatever the Somalis are going through, they need to find their own windows, fling them open and stare at the future, no matter what grave monster is banging on those very window panes and retrieve the peace-baby from the birth waters thrown into the wilderness of diplomatic and political maze.

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NEWS AND EVENTS

GENERAL

Rift Valley Institute Horn of Africa field course 2009

The second Horn of Africa Course will be held from 20 to 26 June 2009, in Lamu, Kenya. For a prospectus and application form please write to horn.course@riftvalley.net. The Horn of Africa Course is a one-week, intensive, graduate-level, residential programme that provides a fast-track introduction to the history, political economy and culture of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, South-central Somalia, Puntland, Somaliland and northern Kenya. The Course is designed for aid workers, diplomats, peacekeepers, researchers, campaigners, business people and journalists, who are living and working in the region or about to start. The course examines the historical and cultural patterns of this diverse region and the contemporary issues and challenges faced by people in these countries. The residential nature of the course provides extensive opportunity for informal exchanges between students and teaching staff. The course is taught by regional and international specialists. The Director of Studies is Ken Menkhaus, Professor of Political Science from Davidson College, and a prolific author on the region. The Course Director is Mark Bradbury, author of "Becoming Somaliland". The teaching staff on this year's course includes the following: Lee Cassanelli, of the University of Pennsylvania, author of "The Shaping of Somali Society"; Terrence Lyons, Associate Professor of Conflict Resolution at the Institute for Conflict Analysis at George Mason University and author of "Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: U.S. Policy toward Ethiopia and Eritrea"; Dekha Ibrahim Abdi, Kenyan civic activist and peace builder and winner of the 2007 Right Livelihood Award; Sally Healy OBE, Fellow of Chatham House and author of the recent report, "Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel"; Jabril Ibrahim Abdulle, civic activist and Director of the Centre for Research and Dialogue, Mogadishu; Kjetil Tronvoll, University of Oslo, co-author of "Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War".

ETHIOPIA

Water pipe sparks off conflict

An estimated 70,000 people have fled their homes in a remote part of southern Ethiopia, after conflict broke out between rival groups. The conflict is said to be triggered by the construction of a new borehole. This part of Ethiopia has a long history of conflict, cattle raiding and fights over water and grazing among various pastoralist communities.

Adapted from BBC Africa, 13 March 2009

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7929104.stm>

KENYA

Somali militants release five Kenyans held in Bula, Hawo

Five Kenyans that were kidnapped on 25 March by a militant group linked to the Al Shabaab were freed after negotiations between the militants and the Kenyan delegation led by the North Eastern Provincial Commissioner Josephat Maingi. The officials had apparently gone shopping from Mandera town in north eastern Kenya into Bula Hawo, which is a kilometer away. The officials were attending the provincial primary school ball games tournament. The governor of Bula Hawo,

Mr. Ahmed Mohamed Barkuus had told the newspaper that the officials had been 'arrested' by the militia, which is in-charge of the security in the area, for crossing illegally into Somalia. Al Shabaab has also demanded that the Kenya police should stop harassing Somalis along the border.

Adapted from the Daily Nation, 26 March 2009

<http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/554052/-/u3pqrk/-/index.html>

SUDAN

African churches want Sudan to allow aid agencies

Leaders of the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) have asked the Sudanese government to "allow uninterrupted humanitarian assistance" in the country following the expulsion of 13 international aid agencies from Sudan's troubled western Darfur province. The African church grouping's main governing body, its General Committee, said in a 26 March statement.

Ecumenical News International www.eni.ch/featured/article.php?id=2855

Statement of the AACC General Committee on the situation in Sudan

www.aacc-ceta.org/en/default2.asp?active_page_id=323&id=29

World leaders react to Bashir's Warrant

The International Criminal Court (ICC) on 4 March issued an arrest warrant for President Bashir of Sudan for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. Mr. Bashir is the first sitting head of state that the ICC has ordered arrested. Mr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, the Sudanese Presidential advisor accused the ICC of not wanting Sudan to become stable. He added that the court was only one mechanism of neo-colonialist policy by the West against free and independent countries. The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General said that the UN will continue to conduct its vital peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights and development operations in the Sudan. He called on all parties to "work in good faith toward a political solution to end the Darfur conflict". He also called for all parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to recommit themselves to its full implementation, which remains the basis for long-term peace and stability in Sudan. Jean Ping, African Union (AU) Commission Chairman said that, "the AU supports the fight against impunity; we can not let the perpetrators go unpunished". He however added that peace and justice should not collide; the need for justice should not override the need for peace. The Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit has urged the UN Security Council to hold an emergency meeting to delay the enforcement of the court decision. More reactions to the arrest warrant can be found following the links below:

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7923797.stm>

<http://tvnz.co.nz/world-news/reaction-warrant-bashirs-arrest-2517697>

RESOURCES

GENERAL

"Conflict early warning: warning who?" (February, 2006)

This article by Caey Barrs challenges the traditional ways of thinking about early warning and response and suggests a new form of local response, Locally-Led Advance Mobile Aid (LLAMA), which can help conflict affected communities build local early warning networks.

http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Early_Warning/earlywarning.pdf

“Pastoralist Voices” (March 2009)

This is a monthly bulletin that supports the process of a policy framework on pastoralism in Africa that will begin to secure and protect the lives and livelihood and rights of pastoralists. This call has been supported by the African Union which began formulating a Pastoral Policy for the continent. The bulletin has an update on the Horn of Africa Pastoral Network. It is published by the African Union and the United Nations.

<http://ochaonline.un.org/Default.aspx?alias=ochaonline.un.org/kenya> or
<http://ochaonline.un.org/rocea>

“Preventing diversion of small arms and light weapons” (February 2009)

This report examines issues and priorities for improving controls and co-operation to prevent and reduce diversion of authorized official or civilian SALW transfers and holdings to unauthorized users or uses. It calls on the international community to launch (or re-launch) concerted initiatives and measures to strengthen their systems for preventing and reducing diversion of all types of SALW (including ammunition, parts and components) from authorized transfers or holdings. It puts forward the actions that are needed at the national, international and regional levels.

The report was written by Owen Greene, University of Bradford, and Elizabeth Kirkham, Safer world.

http://www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php/376/preventing_diversion_of_small_arms_and_light_weapons

“Rethinking post-war insecurity: from interim stabilization to second generation insecurity promotion” (February, 2009)

The article by Dr. Nat J. Colletta and Dr. Robert Muggah argues that although activities such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security system reform (SSR) are now familiar pillars of post-war recovery and reconstruction architecture, there are growing concerns that these interventions are doing more harm than good.

Journal of humanitarian assistance

<http://jha.ac/2009/02/21/rethinking-post-war-insecurity-from-interim-stabilization-to-second-generation-security-promotion/>

UGANDA

“Making water delivery conflict-sensitive in Uganda” (August, 2008)

In societies in conflict, water can projects in Uganda became more conflict-sensitive, and as a result, brought many additional benefits to the recipient communities. The report describes the experiences and lessons learned from promoting conflict-sensitive developments in two water projects, and seek to contribute to a broader understanding of how these approaches can be used by development actors in water and other sectors.

http://www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php/355/water_and_conflict

“Uganda and international small arms transfers: Implementing UN Programme of Action commitments” (July, 2008)

This evaluation report on Uganda’s performance in implementing the United Nations (UN) Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons and all its aspects (UNPoA) commitments as they apply to international transfers of all Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).

www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Uganda_USformat.pdf

SOMALIA

“Current conditions and prospects for a lasting peace” (February, 2009)

This is a paper written by Ted Dagne, a specialist of African affairs and published by the Congressional Research Service. The article analyses several recent developments in Somalia.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33911.pdf>

“Human rights challenges: Somaliland facing elections” (March 2009)

Amnesty International’s report offers recommendations on how to improve the respect, protection and promotion of human rights in Somaliland as a lead up to the upcoming presidential and local elections, scheduled for 2009.

<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR52/001/2009/en>

SUDAN

“Conducting elections in Darfur: Looking ahead to Sudan’s 2009 elections” (March 2009)

The 2005 Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the North and South Sudan requires elections across all levels – local, state, national – by July 2009.

United States Institute of Peace

<http://library.usip.org/articles/1012138.1072/1.PDF>

Horn of Africa Bulletin, Volume 21, No. 3, MARCH 2009

Editorial information

The media review Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) was published by the Life & Peace Institute between 1989 and 2006. The re-formatting of HAB as an e-bulletin 2007 is done in close collaboration with the Nairobi-based All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). The electronic base of HAB is Life & Peace Institute (LPI) and the editor is Olivia Kibui, olivia.kibui@life-peace.org. For subscription matters contact: Selin Amirthalingam, selin.amirthalingam@life-peace.org. For a link to HAB and more information see www.life-peace.org

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