Somalia: Challenges and opportunities for building peace in Somalia. An insider’s perspective on examples for local and international efforts

Keligii cunow, keligaa celceli.
If you decide alone, do it alone.
Somali proverb

Introduction
Placing this year’s Djibouti peace process in the broader framework of 18 years of international efforts to find a solution to the crisis in Somalia, shows that the challenges of the preceding 14 (or more) attempts also characterised the proceedings of Djibouti. Consequently, there is reason to cast doubt on the success of yet another “track one” peace agreement.

In parallel, and often unnoticed by international actors and media, local efforts to improve the security situation and build trust within and among communities have taken place throughout 18 years of conflict. These usually use traditional Somali conflict handling mechanisms. However, as social realities have changed as a result of the long-lasting conflict, dealing more effectively with local level conflicts also requires an extension and re-conceptualisation of traditional approaches.

This article looks at two examples of seeking peace in the Somali context, one at the international level and one at the local level, in order to identify some challenges and opportunities for building peace in Somalia. This article does not aspire to provide a full-fledged analysis of the complex dynamics of the current conflicts in Somalia, nor does it recommend a comprehensive solution. The experiences from the given examples, however, can help in identifying some recommendations for peacebuilding in Somalia.

The Djibouti peace process: Repeating old mistakes?
The Djibouti peace process set off in June 2008, when 10 days of United Nations (UN)-facilitated negotiations between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
and one section of its main opposition group, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), resulted in the declaration of intentions to implement a ceasefire and to develop a plan for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. The agreement was formally signed on 18 August and a second round of talks followed in September. Finally, on 26 October, the parties agreed on a concrete roadmap for the implementation of the ceasefire that was to become effective on 5 November and the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops, which is scheduled to set off on 21 November with their relocation from major urban centres.

The Djibouti peace process was clearly a formal, externally facilitated and financed process focusing on political leaders, i.e. acting on track one. Representatives of Somali civil society were granted observer rights. However, major actors, in particular al shabaab, were not invited, and they also did not show any willingness to be part of this process. Al shabaab is the former military wing of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) that split from its mother organisation and never became a member of the ARS. Since its inception in 2006 it has been a main military actor in south central Somalia. In connection to the Djibouti peace talks, a clear upsurge of fighting could be identified in Somalia. This has been a recurring phenomenon during the almost 18 years of gathering Somali “leaders” outside of Somalia on “neutral grounds” in order to bring about peace. A key problem of such efforts is the issue of representation, i.e. that certain groups inside Somalia do not feel represented by the “leaders” that were selected as representatives for the Somali people. Internationally mediated Somali peace negotiations have exposed a certain disconnection from local realities. It seems that the international community repeats the same mistake over and over again by selecting a group of leaders that is not inclusive and is disconnected from realities within Somalia. This of course also reflects internal power struggles, as invited parties often threaten to withdraw if opposing groups are invited to the negotiation table by the host of the peace talks.

Related to that, another problem of internationally mediated peace talks, not least the recent Djibouti talks, is that central parties to the conflict tend to disintegrate due to infighting. This year’s negotiations exposed a rift within the Alliance, which had split into two factions. Whilst the Djibouti wing of the ARS, led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, supported negotiations with the TFG, the one based in Asmara under the leadership of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys rejected negotiations and the agreement. Also, the TFG has split in two hostile camps following either the reconciliation course of interim Prime Minister Nur “Adde” Hassan Hussein, or the less reconciliatory approach of Transitional President’s Abdullahi Yusuf. In addition, al shabaab vowed to continue the fight against the tandem of TFG and Ethiopian troops “occupying” Somalia. Al shabaab has categorically refused to become part of any such agreement.

Furthermore, the process of facilitation at the Djibouti talks reflected a clear lack of sensitivity for Somali ways of negotiation. The UN team that was mediating the Djibouti process did not include any Somali resource persons. Thus, the team could not have a full understanding of the Somali context. This was evident in the UN’s instruction – due to financial constraints – that an agreement would have to be reached within just a few days of deliberations. This is not, however, the Somali way of negotiating. Informal meetings hold a prominent position in the Somali approach to negotiation. Such gatherings usually take place in preparation of formal deliberations and are also held concurrently to such talks. These informal meetings are open to almost everybody.

Local efforts to build peace: the need to adapt traditional mechanisms

Traditional Somali ways of solving problems and dealing with conflicts are characterised by the following elements: Respected traditional elders and prominent Islamic scholars gather in order to address the issue at stake. They discuss the matter at an open venue, which allows every community member to contribute to a solution. In
order to deal with a conflict situation, the offender side needs to acknowledge the act of aggression and make a symbolic gesture. Another principle is that the process is owned by the whole community. In summary, features such as inclusiveness, openness and common ownership are essential for any Somali peace process.

But nowadays, when traditional elders intervene in conflict situations, they still assume that they represent the community. However, almost two decades of civil war have changed the social structure of Somalis. Today, the clan structure is divided. Apart from elders, also business men, warlords and militia members assume very influential roles in the society. In today’s political dynamics, these actors are not always controlled by, or accountable to, traditional clan authorities. This transformation of the societal structure is not always acknowledged by traditional elders, meaning that they don’t include such influential actors in efforts to find solutions. Thus, it is often the case that even if a solution is reached, militias continue fighting and other actors spoil the process.

One example illustrating the insufficiency of traditional mediation alone was experienced and documented by Somali Peace Line (SPL), a local peacebuilding organisation that has existed since 1995. Since the beginning of the civil war in 1990, the Bermuda Triangle neighbourhood had seen daily and often violent confrontations between the inhabitants of this part of Mogadishu, who all belonged to the same sub-clan. In April 2004, mediation by the traditional leader Imam Mohamud Imam Omar tried to stop the fighting between two militia groups, one coming from Sigale in the Hodan District and the other one from the Waberi district. However, reflecting the assumption that clan elders represent the community including militias, the latter were not part of the mediation initiative. Therefore, the Imam and the representatives of the conflicting parties could not solve the main issue: the control of the area of Bermuda and the hostility between the militias. Consequently, the fighting restarted after the mediation.

In order to deal with this pressing issue, SPL contacted the District Commissioner of the District of Waberi and other influential personalities. The intention was to provide more space for dialogue to the warring parts. In June 2004, SPL organised a meeting including the key militia representatives at Hamed University hall. Each of the two hostile militias was represented by 6 key members. In addition, the District Commissioner of the district and his assistant joined the talks. The SPL facilitator initiated a discussion among the parties, focusing on their motivations for fighting each other and possible alternative ways of dealing with their differences. The participants were outspoken, transparent and frank. Both parties confirmed that serious hostilities had occurred between them for several times. They stated “we are the leading personalities of the fighting militias; we are people who have been hostile to each other for a long time and have killed many people. When we meet outside of the villages of our district, we are not enemies. But when we are inside the villages of our district, there are prejudices and hatred among us and no one dares to visit the other group.” Thus, hatred not only originated from the militias themselves, but was embedded in the respective neighbourhoods.

In a second step, the focus was put on how to overcome this situation. One of the participants suggested that “we could overcome if we could be so courageous as to exchange visits to each other”. After a long discussion and debate among themselves, they all agreed to this suggestion. The spirit emerging from the discussion was that if they just had the will to make peace, they were capable to do so. There was a strong commitment among the participants to break the barriers between the groups and pay visits to each other. They all agreed to go together and visit every part of the district to show the people that they had overcome hatred and prejudices, and from then on would stand side by side to promote peace together. Sticking to their agreement, after the meeting they all went together and visited every part of the district, and the community members became delighted when they saw them being together without guns and fear.
Conclusion: Some recommendations

This article has illustrated that efforts to build peace – be they local or international – face serious challenges. One of them is the inclusion of all parties to the conflict. Usually the traditional ways of dealing with conflicts marginalise some of the conflict actors, who might, however, be the crucial ones in that particular conflict. Inclusiveness is very essential in every conflict transformation process. Peacebuilders must try to explore the potentiality of each and every actor. As the example from the Bermuda neighbourhood above has shown, even militias can be peacemakers. In external mediation efforts, all major conflict actors need to be part of the negotiation table. In the current situation this means in particular that al shabaab needs to be invited and ways of encouraging its participation in the face of its reluctance have to be found.

In addition, and drawing on the experiences from numerous failed international peace processes, one can conclude that the peace process, at least some phases of it, should take place inside Somalia. Also, a Somali peace process needs Somali technical advisors, artists and women’s groups, and moderate religious people in order to create an informal process within the main process, which would support confidence-building among the parties.

Efforts by the international community to contribute to peace and stability in Somalia should be guided by the question of how a peace process could be supported that is owned by the Somalis themselves.

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The bombings in Somaliland and Puntland – an attempt to drag the north into the politics of violence in southern Somalia

For years, the situation in Somaliland and Puntland had remained relatively calm. Somaliland, in the northwest of the Somali peninsula, unilaterally seceded from the rest of war-torn Somalia in May 1991. Since then it has overcome internal tensions and managed to rebuild a stable and peaceful polity. In recent years, political reforms were introduced that lead to an increasing democratisation of the country. Compared to its neighbour to the west, Puntland in the northeast is a late-comer. It was established only in August 1998 as federal state of a future Federal Republic of Somalia. It did not accept the secession of Somaliland but adhered to Somali unity. Internally, it is based on power sharing between the three largest Harti clans inhabiting its territory. Both political entities managed to distance themselves from the warlordism and factional fighting in Mogadishu and the rest of the south. The everyday life of the people in the north was characterised by the efforts of peacefully rebuilding their society. For years the only large scale security threat in the north emanated from the continued conflict between Somaliland and Puntland over the Harti inhabited regions Sool, Sanaag and Southern Togdheer. These regions are simultaneously claimed by Somaliland and Puntland as part of their respective state territories. While violence erupted occasionally in the contested borderlands, the centres of both political entities remained stable and peaceful. Currently, both governments in Hargeysa (Somaliland) and Garoowe (Puntland) are preparing presidential elections for early next year.

Throughout 2008 it became clear, however, that the general security situation in Puntland in the northeast of the Somali peninsula was deteriorating. The region
made international headlines as the hotbed of piracy in the Horn of Africa. In the last twelve months, several dozen ships have been hijacked and high sums have been paid to pirates by foreign governments in order to free ships and crews. Garoowe obviously lacks the means to prevent piracy within its territory. Moreover, criminality and violence has increased in the interior of Puntland. Armed gangs operate in the large towns such as Boosaaso, Garoowe and Gaalkacyo. Several international NGOs were attacked and a few foreigners were abducted and released only against ransom payments. This situation in Puntland is strongly linked with Garoowe’s continued support for Abdullahi Yusuf and his Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Abdullahi Yusuf, who belongs to the Majeerteen clan of the Darood clan-family, was President of Puntland between 1998 and 2004. After his election as head of the TFG in October 2004, many soldiers of the Puntland army were sent to the south in order to support Abdullahi Yusuf’s fight for power in Mogadishu and environs. This caused a security vacuum in the northeast that the new President of Puntland, Mahamud Hirsi Adde Muuse, was not able to fill. However, until recently it seemed that Puntland’s slow decay could be stopped by a new President coming to power in the January elections. One could even have speculated that in the case of a regime change and in the face of the TFG’s failure, Puntland would have opted for enforcing its autonomy from politics in the South.

Now, violent politics predominant in the south seem to have crept in to the north. Five concerted suicide bomb attacks hit Somaliland and Puntland on 29 October 2008. In Hargeysa, the capital city of Somaliland, the Presidential Palace, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) compound and the Ethiopian liaison office were attacked. In Puntland, two offices of the Puntland Intelligence Service (PIS) in the town of Boosaaso were bombed. In total, more than 20 persons were killed and about 35 were injured. While the local security forces have not yet definitively identified the perpetrators, it can be assumed that Somali Islamists and nationalists with relations to the south were behind the well organised and devastating attacks. This reasoning is based on the timing and the targets of the attacks.

First, the attacks happened simultaneously with a press conference being held in Nairobi, at which the results of negotiations between the TFG and the Djibouti faction of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) were announced. The negotiations had been held under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). The explosions in northern Somalia could be interpreted as a forceful demonstration that the meeting in Nairobi did not have the approval of the more radical and militarily powerful groups in Somalia. Second, the targets that were chosen both in Somaliland and Puntland point to larger political connections with the south. The Presidential palace in Hargeysa is the center from which Somaliland’s struggle for independence is coordinated. This independence, however, has never been accepted by Somali nationalists. Under the brief rule of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006, it became clear that Islamist politics in southern Somalia are also strongly informed by (Pan-) Somali nationalism. The UNDP office in Hargeysa stands for large scale development projects in Somaliland, including training for the security forces and support for the Hargeysa University, where Somaliland’s upcoming elite is educated. Thus, the organisation is a stabilizing factor in Somaliland and, at least indirectly, contributes to the country’s future independence under a new generation of regional leaders. As part of the UN system, the UNDP of course also supports the TFG in the south.

The Ethiopian liaison office, of course, is an easy target for those who wish vengeance for Ethiopia’s brutal military campaign in Mogadishu and its environs. The aims in Boosaaso are directly related to Abdullahi Yusuf. The PIS was established under his Presidency in Puntland. Many leading PIS officers are close relatives of Abdullahi Yusuf. Since the latter is the head of the TFG, he and his ‘family’ can be perceived as prime targets of insurgents fighting the TFG in southern Somalia.
This brief analysis does not suggest that those involved in the attacks necessarily originated from the south. Of course there are a number of native ‘northerners’ who are sympathetic to radical Islamic and (Pan-) Somali causes. Yet, whoever the perpetrators and their supporters were, the bombings clearly point to the overall aim of the attackers to drag the relative peaceful and stable polities of Somaliland and Puntland forcefully into the violent politics of southern Somalia. The immediate danger is that the explosions demonstrated the vulnerability of Somaliland and Puntland, and will lead to follow-up operations of radical groups with networks all over the Somali peninsula. It remains to be seen whether the governments in Hargeysa and Garoowe can handle this threat. Without some external solidarity and effective support, this will be a very difficult task. Apart from some very brief reports on BBC and CNN, the international community has not noticed what happened in Somaliland and Puntland.

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NEWS AND EVENTS

GENERAL

“Africa – Step forth in faith”: The upcoming Ninth AACC General Assembly

For the ninth time, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) will gather delegates of member churches and National Christian Councils, as well as civil society representatives, in Maputo (Mozambique) to hold its General Assembly from 7 to 12 December. The Assembly will be a platform for the Churches in Africa to chart their participation in the agenda for the renaissance of the continent. Assembly participants will attend 9 thematic workshops that will focus on some of the most pressing challenges facing the continent today, such human rights in Africa, environmental conservation, economical liberation, HIV and other serious diseases, and the role of youth and women. Each of these themes will be approached from a Christian perspective in order to identify what the African Church can do in order to address the challenges.

Founded in Kampala in 1963, the AACC brings together 173 member churches and Christian Councils in 40 African countries. It is the largest ecumenical organization in Africa, representing over 120 million Christians.

KENYA

Church concerned as thousands flee in north-eastern province

According to the Catholic diocese of Lowdar, some 5,000 people have been displaced in north-eastern Kenya following the killing of three members of the Turkana community. They were shot in what was said to have been a minor quarrel. The attacker is suspected to be Ethiopian and coming from the Merile community that lives in both Kenya and Ethiopia. Following the attack, thousands of Turkana have fled from Todonyang to Lowarengak for fear of further attacks. The parish priest, Fr. Fernando Aguirre, said less than 70 people were left in the Todonyang community.
The incident has disrupted the peace that the Ethiopian Merile and Kenyan Turkana have enjoyed for the last two years. The elders of the two communities, as well as government and church officials have urged residents to treat the attack as an isolated incident.

*Catholic Information Service for Africa (CISA)*

**Kenyan Catholic Bishops urge for implementation of Waki and Kriegler reports**

In a statement on 6 November, the Catholic Bishops of Kenya have supported the implementation of both the Waki and Kriegler report. In the weeks since the release of the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence headed by Judge Waki (17 October), Kenyan politicians have closed ranks to reject it. Therefore, the establishment of a Special Tribunal to try the indicted persons seems unlikely.

In their statement, the Bishops warned that the root causes of the post-election crisis were still existent. Kenya was at the crossroads and the Kriegler and Waki reports provided the opportunity “to confront the culture of impunity”. Failing to implement the findings could lead to a degeneration “into further crises, ineptitude and moral stagnation.” However, by “taking its medicine now”, Kenya could regain its strength and become an “ambassador for peace” in the entire region.

The statement by the Bishops was awaited and came after the Anglican Church had already supported the implementation of the Waki report.

*Statement by Catholic Bishops of Kenya, Catholic Information Service for Africa (CISA), Catholic News Service (CNS), The Nation (Nairobi)*

**SUDAN**

**Sudanese Catholic Bishops concerned over CPA implementation**

In a pastoral letter written at the end of their annual meeting held in Yambio from 5 to 14 November, the Catholic Bishops of Sudan voiced their concern that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is losing momentum. The letter entitled *The Word of God: Source of Reconciliation, Justice and Peace* analyses the political situation in the Sudan, calls for genuine elections and emphasises the need for a change of attitude in order to enact the principles of good governance and democracy. During the 10-day assembly, the bishops discussed the progress of the CPA and the steps that the state, church, civil society leaders and citizens can take to help push the Agreement forward.

Talking to a local radio station in Yambio, the President of the Sudan Catholic Bishop Conference, Bishop Rudolph Deng Majak, asked Christians and Muslims to refocus on the CPA and urged their leaders to mobilise the faithful to walk together, reconciled and united to implement the peace agreement.

*Gurtong, Sudan Tribune (ST), Catholic Information Service for Africa (CISA)*

**South Sudan media houses call for more press freedom**

Media houses in South Sudan have appealed to the Government to uphold freedom of the media. At a meeting with the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, the Hon. Gabriel Changson Chang, on 20 November the press quoted insecurity, denial of access to information and lack of printing press facilities as the key challenges hindering the performance of the media in south Sudan. In his contribution, the Chief Editor of the Citizen Newspaper, Mr. Nhial Bol, said that the Government’s policies on the media were not clear and called for the release of the Media Law to guide the operations of the media. “Journalists are frequently harassed, arrested and detained without charges pressed against them. This has been due to the lack of a clear operational framework that can only be addressed by the Media Law”, said Bol.

The Minister said that the Media Law has been forwarded to the Ministry of Legal Affairs and is being studied before its submission to the Council of Ministers.
Hon. Chang urged the press to actively play its role and educate the public on the need for security so as to have a peaceful working atmosphere as well as general peace in South Sudan. He cautioned the media against abusing the privilege of access to information to criticise the government. The minister called on all media houses to exercise self censorship and control so as to avoid unnecessary conflict with the government and other concerned parties.

_Sudan papers suspend publication in protest against censorship_

Ten Sudanese newspapers have suspended publication on 18 November as part of a growing protest against state censorship. The protest came a day after more than 60 journalists and newspaper staff were detained for more than three hours by police after staging a rally outside Sudan’s parliament. Reporters said the suspension had been driven by individual journalists who had approached their editors and management. They are members of a recently formed Sudan Journalists’ Network, which is also campaigning for a new press law to guarantee press freedoms promised under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Journalists complain about nightly visits from security officers who are said to instruct editors to remove sensitive articles from the next day’s edition.

_Uganda_

_ICC Judges to review LRA cases_

Judges at the International Criminal Court (ICC) begin a formal review of cases against leading members of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to determine if they are still viable and whether Uganda’s proposed special court could be used for some of the prosecutions. Approached by the Ugandan Government, the ICC indicted five of the LRA’s top commanders. At the time, Uganda said that it was unable to conduct investigations and prosecutions nationally. However, in the course of peace talks between the Government and the LRA, the establishment of a national special court was agreed upon, mainly because LRA leader Joseph Kony refused to be tried by the ICC. The agreement has prompted the ICC to review the LRA case. ICC judges have asked the Ugandan Government, and lawyers representing the defence, prosecution and victims for fresh opinions on the cases and about whether the country’s efforts to prosecute war crimes are genuine and should replace the ICC cases. Some analysts point out that Uganda’s lack of legislation to prosecute war crimes is a clear obstacle for a trial against the LRA commanders in the country.

Victim’s groups in Uganda have warned that the Ugandan Government might be giving in to LRA demands and may be willing to compromise justice to achieve permanent settlement of the conflict.

_New report shows high levels of corruption_

The 2008 Inspectorate Government National Integrity Survey reveals that the Ugandan police and judiciary are the most corrupt public institutions. The report was commissioned by the Inspector General of Government (IGG) and carried out by a local research firm. It is not based on actual cases of corruption, but on public surveys in which people are asked to name those institutions where they encounter corruption most. According to the survey, more than 8 out of 10 persons named the police force as most corrupt. Released on 19 November, the report shows that the
Uganda Revenue Authority, district service commissions, power distributor Umeme and the public pension scheme are other institutions where corruption has flourished. The survey also reveals that most Ugandans are afraid of reporting corruption cases. In addition, most Ugandan’s believe that anti-corruption institutions have failed.

The Principal Judge, James Ogoola, stated in reaction to the report that Uganda’s future was endangered if the Government did not seriously address the “cancer of corruption”. He agreed that the Ugandan judiciary was corrupt. Ugandan Revenue Authority spokesman Paul Kyeyune, however, dismissed the report with the words “I have not read it, but I guess it might not be accurate. We have improved so much and no one can believe that after four years we are still in the same position.”

*The Monitor (Kampala)*

**RESOURCES**

**GENERAL**

**AACC Ninth General Assembly website**


“*Eastern Africa: Security and the legacy of fragility*” (October 2008)

The main challenges to human security in Eastern Africa have originated from political and state fragility, resource scarcities, and environmental degradation. All of these factors have contributed to a regional context that is characterised by intrastate conflicts, interstate wars, and political extremism. Gilbert M. Khadiagala – for the International Peace Institute (IPI) – analyses key challenges for the region and mechanisms for addressing them. He also gives recommendations based on a scenario analysis.

www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/404/eastern_africa.pdf

**Pastoralist conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa**

The paper “Access-Management-Ownership: The ‘Water & Pasture Menu’ in pastoralist conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa” was presented at the conference “Natural resources conflict in Africa – Is water the new oil?” organised by the Human Security Initiative and the Institute for Security Studies in November 2008. M.J. Kimani contends that access, management and ownership are the basic ingredients constituting the ‘menu’ of pastoralist conflicts over natural resources. The paper attempts to present this ‘menu’ by first grounding it within the wider pastoralist conflict sphere, highlighting challenges thereof, and presenting a regionally typical instrument and finally a simple generic checklist summarising a problem-solution analogy.

www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/ISS_HornAfrica_Water-PastureMenuPastoralistConflicts.pdf

**Centre on Human Rights in Conflict**

The Centre on Human Rights in Conflict (CHRC) is an interdisciplinary centre promoting policy relevant research and events aimed at developing greater knowledge about the relationship between human rights and conflict. The Centre also conducts activities relating to Islamic human rights and human rights and civil liberties in the war on terror.

www.uel.ac.uk/chrc/index.htm
KENYA

Kenyan civil society reacting to politicians’ rejection of the Waki report

Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR)
In a press release (13 November), KNCHR expresses “its strong opposition to any political attempts to discredit the report’s findings and undermine justice.”
www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/51951

Kenyans for Peace through Truth and Justice (KPTJ) issue a strongly worded statement urging full implementation of the recommendations.
www.pambazuka.org/en/category/elections/51717

African Centre for Technology Studies:
“Land tenure and violent conflict in Kenya” (October 2008)
The violence which followed the contested December 2007 Kenyan election was, arguably, an opportunity for historical grievances to be settled. This conference report by the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) focuses on the land issue in regards to Kenya, asserting that land is a primary cause of conflict in the country.

“Militianisation of resource conflicts:
The case of land-based conflict in the Mount Elgon region of Western Kenya”
(Institute for Security Studies Monograph 152, October 2008)
Robert Romborah Simiyu traces the trajectory of the conflict in the Mount Elgon District, unravels its root causes and other contributory factors, discusses the various responses by the state, and makes proposals on what could be done to attain sustainable peace in the region.
www.issafrica.org/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/M152FULL.PDF?link_id=3&slink_id=6904&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3

SOMALIA

“Somalia: An accountability free zone”
www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2946

www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.htm

New Amnesty International report
The report “Fatal Insecurity: Attacks on aid workers and rights defenders in Somalia” (November 2008) calls for the arms embargo to be strengthened, for neighbouring countries to open their borders to Somalis seeking asylum, and for the international community to provide support to those forced to flee their country.
“Somalia: Policy overhaul required” (November 2008)
This report by Patrick Duplat and Jake Kurtzer gives key policy recommendations for addressing the pressing issue of displacement. The authors recently returned from Djibouti, Somaliland and Kenya where they assessed the humanitarian situation for displaced Somalis.

SUDAN
“Inter-Governmental relations in Sudan” (September 2008)
Trace D. Cook presents findings from interviews with government officials and legislators at the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and state levels that were conducted between October 2007 and April 2008.

Report about opportunities and obstacles to the reintegration of IDPs and refugees
The Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) paper “The Long Road Home: Opportunities and obstacles to the reintegration of IDPs and refugees returning to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas. Report of Phase II: Conflict, urbanisation and land” (September 2008) presents the findings from the second phase of an in-depth research project on the reintegration of IDPs and refugees returning to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas. Research in Phase II was carried out in Juba town and Jonglei State.

UGANDA
“Left to their own devices: The continued suffering of victims of the conflict in Northern Uganda and the need for reparations” (November 2008)
During northern Uganda’s 20-year conflict between the Government of Uganda’s (GoU) armed forces and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), widespread human rights abuses were committed by both sides. The report examines the continued suffering of the victims of the hostilities and makes recommendations to the Government on how to deal with the aftermath of the human rights violations that took place there.
Horn of Africa Bulletin, Volume 20, No. 11, NOVEMBER 2008

Editorial information
The media review Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) was published by the Life & Peace Institute between 1989 and 2006. The re-formatting of HAB as an e-bulletin 2007 is done in close collaboration with the Nairobi-based All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCCLAHA). The electronic base of HAB is LPI and the editor is Charlotte Booth, charlotte.booth@life-peace.org
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For a link to HAB and more information see www.life-peace.org

Editorial principles
The Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) is an international newsletter, compiling analyses, news and resources primarily in the Horn of Africa region. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily represent the views of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) or the cooperating partners, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCCLAHA). Writers and sources are normally referred to, although in exceptional cases, the editors of the HAB may choose not to reveal the real identity of a writer or publish the source.