



# HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN

ANALYSES • CONTEXT • CONNECTIONS

---

## Analyses

- ▶ **The next Sudanese war**
- ▶ **An epidemic of proxy wars**
- ▶ **Plea for a whole Sudan approach**

## News and events

## Resources and links

### The next Sudanese war

The year is 2011. As the SPLA Antonov makes its second high altitude pass over the GIAD military industrial complex south of Khartoum, people run around in wild panic – nobody had warned them to dig bomb shelters. Smoke from the first stick of bombs drifts amongst the factories along with the screams of the wounded and dying.

Radio Omdurman has been trumpeting the success of Khartoum’s forces in quickly overrunning Renk, Melut and Bentiu (not surprising really, as so many northern forces were already there “protecting” the oil fields) but plays down the heavy losses they are taking around Malakal. The government radio station also fails to mention the speed with which Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) forces mobilised in Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains, and joined with opposition forces from Darfur, Kordofan and the Eastern Front to pose a serious threat to the flanks of the government columns invading the south.

Government propaganda is quick to blame outside intervention. Uganda and Eritrea are the more credible “usual suspects” but the USA and Israel are thrown in to garner some Arab sympathy. There are rumours of heavy fighting in Khartoum itself. Embassies report that they can hear continuous gunfire and see bodies in the streets, but a total curfew and news black-out has prevented any details from emerging.

Back to 2007. Peace has come to southern Sudan. Southerners were exhausted by the war and welcomed the peace. But even as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was being signed, the mantra throughout the south was, “War is better than a bad peace”. And too many southerners, when asked now what are the benefits after two years of peace, are saying, “Well, the Antonov no longer bombs us, and there is freedom of movement, but apart from that, very little has changed.” Where is the promised peace dividend?

Already the National Congress Party/National Islamic Front (NCP/NIF) is using every means at its disposal to delay and undermine the implementation of the CPA. A number of key commissions have not yet been formed, or have been formed but have hardly ever met (and in the case of the Abyei Border Commission, has had its report rejected by the NCP). Northern forces have not yet left the south, and there are reports that in the oil fields they are actually being reinforced.

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) ministers in the Government of National Unity (GNU) have no real power or influence. National government is

still run by the NCP/NIF without serious reference to SPLM. The northern security apparatus has not been dismantled. Southerners believe they are not receiving their true 50 percent share of the oil. The billions of dollars promised for reconstruction and development has been slow to arrive and basic services are still lacking across most of the south. The war in Darfur drags on, leading to regional instability.

The census is delayed, which will cause a delay in the elections scheduled for 2008. Some excuse will be found to delay the referendum in 2011. If that fails, the referendum will be rigged. And if that too fails, and southerners manage to vote for secession, then some mechanism will be found (possibly with the connivance of members of the international community and even the AU, who don't want to see another new state in Africa) to avoid actually granting independence. "Too many agreements dishonoured", to quote Uncle Abel Alier, and southerners are determined that this one will not be dishonoured without a fight. Both sides are preparing for war.

The third southern civil war in Sudan will be more terrible than the first two, and will have some very different characteristics.

- Both the previous wars began with the government controlling the south. The liberation movements began in the bush and had to fight to control territory gradually. The third war will begin with the SPLA in control of virtually the whole south, except perhaps parts of the oil fields, which are still occupied by northern security forces. Fighting will begin on the north-south border.

Northern forces will invade, and may quickly capture some of the towns close to the border. However, SPLA will maintain its hold on most of the south, giving it secure rear bases and an undisputed border with friendly neighbours. A limited war to annex the oil fields of Greater Upper Nile and the rich agricultural lands of Renk, Kordofan and Blue Nile may be all that Khartoum wants, but southerners will not rest easy while any of the south remains in northern hands.

- Southerners have vowed that they will take the third war to the north. Both previous wars were fought in the south, apart from Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile. When Kurmuk, a town which the northerners perceive as northern, was taken in 1987 and again in 1997, there was consternation throughout the north.
- SPLA will have air power during the next war. "Air power" does not have to be very sophisticated. In the second civil war Khartoum found itself unable to make effective military use of its jet fighter bombers and helicopter gunships as they got shot down by ground fire too easily. In fact its air power had very little military value.

The north theoretically has air-to-air and ground-to-air interception capability, but in the 2.4 million square kilometres which make up Sudan's air space it is likely that SPLA Antonovs and gunships will have plenty of opportunity to cause panic amongst civilians in the north.

- There are 1,500 SPLA troops in Khartoum in the Joint Integrated Units. If war breaks out, they are unlikely to sit back and surrender their arms. They will be joined by Darfurian Sudan Liberation Army forces and there could be a spontaneous uprising by southerners and westerners in the displaced camps and shanty towns around the three cities. Whatever the outcome, it will be very bloody before it is put down.
- In the next war, SPLA has ready-made allies, some already mobilised and battle-hardened. The war will probably not start in the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile. The late Yussuf Kuwa used to say that he did not want his area to be responsible for keeping the southerners from peace, and current leaders are likely to follow that philosophy. But these two areas have obtained nothing from the CPA and they will be eager to fight alongside the south again.

There are fears that tensions in Kordofan will escalate into open conflict even now. If the southern war starts again, Khartoum may be surprised to find that many of its former Baggara allies have realised the extent to which they have

been used, abused, manipulated and marginalised by Khartoum, and this time will fight alongside the south. The Eastern Front is now at peace, but who can tell whether their peace agreement will be honoured or dishonoured? In any case, if there is a general outbreak of hostilities again, they may well have little option but to join in, especially if Eritrea supports them. Darfur is a natural ally for the south. Since most of the initial fighting is likely to be on the north-south border, these allies will threaten the flanks and the rear of Khartoum's invasion force.

- In the two previous civil wars, the south was unprepared, and its liberation armies began from very small ad hoc forces. This time the south will begin with a large standing army and with arms and materiel which it could never have dreamed of before. The north will probably have more sophisticated weaponry and will have more of everything, but it lacks committed troops. "Real" northerners have shown a marked reluctance to get their hands dirty in real fighting. The PDF, a mixture of local mujahidiin and reluctant conscripts, has not proved too effective as a fighting force. Much of the real fighting was done by militias, and their loyalty cannot be guaranteed in the next war. SPLA troops, on the other hand, will be fighting on their home ground to defend their own nation. Their morale will be high.

Many southerners are already convinced that there will be a third war. The only discussion is when. Will it start around the time of the referendum in 2011, or will there be some earlier trigger – perhaps the census, or elections, or militia activity, or whatever? But it is not inevitable. If there is enough realism by all stakeholders at an early enough stage, then some of the problems can be addressed.

The basic problem, whether in Darfur, the south or the east, is at the centre – the domination of Sudanese political systems by a small riverain elite, currently embodied in the NCP/NIF regime, which seeks to control and marginalise the peripheries whilst also insisting on a particular cultural and religious identity for the whole of Sudan. If the international community remains in denial and the NCP/NIF regime is allowed to continue undermining the CPA, and if southerners are not allowed to exercise their right of self-determination in a free, fair and credible manner, then war there will be.

*John Ashworth*

*Freelance journalist and consultant, earlier coordinator of Sudan Focal Point Africa, a peace and advocacy ministry of the Sudanese Churches*

## **An epidemic of proxy wars**

One positive news story coming out of Africa is the continent's dramatic reduction in civil wars. Active armed conflicts dropped from thirteen to five between 2002 and 2005, according to a recent International Peace Academy study.<sup>1</sup> But not so the Horn of Africa, which continues to rank among the most conflict-ridden places on Earth. Wars in Darfur and Somalia have since 2003 produced two of the world's worst humanitarian crises. These new wars join an alarming list of ongoing low-intensity wars, unresolved conflicts, and peace accords on the verge of collapse stretching from northern Uganda to south Sudan to the Ethiopia-Eritrea border.

What accounts for the fact that the Horn of Africa seems so prone to protracted armed conflict and so impervious to mediation efforts? There is no blanket answer to this question. Each of the many wars in the Horn is fuelled by its own unique "lethal cocktail" of conflict drivers. Resource scarcity, political manipulation of ethnic tensions, war economies, small arms proliferation, state failure, and predatory state behaviour toward populations in the hinterlands are among the many factors which have ignited or prolonged armed violence in the region.

But one of the most persistent and widespread conflict drivers in the Horn of Africa is the phenomenon of proxy wars. In an April 2007 report, the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey documented no fewer than 34 instances of proxy wars sponsored

by Horn of Africa states against one of their neighbours since the 1960s.<sup>2</sup> Three states – Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan – are the main offenders, collectively responsible for sponsoring 25 proxy wars in the region.

Sponsorship of proxy wars is especially pernicious in prolonging existing armed conflicts. Because they invariably involve provision of weaponry to insurgents, proxy wars are a major cause of small arms proliferation in the region. Proxy wars also involve provision of safe haven to insurgencies, which shields them from attack and which removes the leadership of these armed groups from the destruction they wreak in the countryside. The proverbial “hurting stalemate” is much more difficult to reach when leaders of both government and insurgency forces are safely ensconced in distant cities, far from the fighting. The people experiencing the hurting are not the people directing and funding the fighting.

The fact that regional states are so widely culpable of sponsoring wars in one another’s backyards is especially appalling in light of the stated objectives of the regional organization Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to prevent and manage conflict in the Horn of Africa. IGAD’s ability to play a constructive role as a mediator is entirely undercut by the behaviour of its member states.

The most recent and egregious example of this is in Somalia, where Eritrea and Ethiopia have played out their unresolved hostilities by supporting rival Somali groups. Neither the Transitional Federal Government (backed by Ethiopia) nor the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC), backed by Eritrea, would have gone to war with the level of destructiveness and loss of life witnessed in 2006 and 2007, were it not for the military, logistical, and political support of their external patrons. Ethiopia’s direct armed intervention into Somalia and its indiscriminate use of heavy weapons in civilian neighbourhoods of Mogadishu, have justifiably earned heavy criticism. But Eritrea’s backing of the CIC with arms and advisors was also pivotal in accelerating the current crisis.

Regional states are not the exclusive culprits in the Horn’s epidemic of proxy wars. Armed groups in the region often sponsor other insurgencies - the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, for instance, provided weapons to the Sudan Liberation Movement in Darfur, and the CIC provided safe haven to two anti-Ethiopian insurgencies, the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front. Likewise, states in the region have found it expedient to conduct proxy wars within their own borders, by arming and encouraging tribal militias, local protection forces, and other paramilitaries against insurgency movements fighting the government. Outsourcing war has become a cheap and effective means of combating enemies in the Horn of Africa, but at a horrific cost to the civilians caught in the crossfire.

Worse, the growing prospect of a new, global form of proxy warfare in the Horn, the struggle between a US-backed counter-terrorism coalition against groups receiving real or perceived backing from al Qai’da, runs the real risk of plunging parts of the region into even greater levels of armed violence.

Proxy wars are the most easily preventable source of warfare in the region. While finding an enduring solution to power-sharing in Sudan, state collapse in Somalia, resource scarcity in northern Kenya, or disarmament in the Karamoja cluster are all daunting challenges that could take years or even decades, proxy wars can be ended simply by decree. It will happen when top political figures in the region develop the vision and leadership to reach an understanding making it unacceptable to sponsor wars in one another’s hinterlands, and when the international community begins to take more decisive action against states and non-state actors violating arms embargoes in the region.

*Ken Menkhaus*

*Professor of Political Science at Davidson College, North Carolina, USA*

1 Andrew Mack, “Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post Cold War Decline,” International Peace Academy, “Coping with Crisis” Working Paper Series (March 2007), p. 1. [http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/146/CWC\\_Working\\_Paper\\_POLITICAL\\_Violence\\_AM.pdf](http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/146/CWC_Working_Paper_POLITICAL_Violence_AM.pdf)

2 Small Arms Survey, Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment Issue Brief No. 6, “The Militarization of Sudan,” (April 2007), p.3. [http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan\\_pdf/SIB%206%20militarization.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SIB%206%20militarization.pdf)

## Plea for a whole Sudan approach

*Following the trend of basically focusing all attention on Darfur not only falls short of providing any durable solution but bears the potential danger that the whole country, maybe the whole region, will soon be in flames. The time for “piece-meal” approaches should be over. Urgently needed is a “whole Sudan” profound analysis, approach and strategy.*

Despite serious efforts and some undeniable improvement on some levels, the general picture and outlook is not promising at present. While public and diplomatic international attention is focusing once again on only one part of Sudan, namely the Darfur crisis, the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement is basically ignored, the implementation process of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is in danger to seriously derail, the level of mistrust among and between northerners and southerners seems to have reached a new peak, armed conflicts are increasing, and critical regions like the East, the Nuba mountains, southern Blue Nile and Abyei seem to have vanished almost completely from the screen of those who committed themselves to safeguard the CPA. The situation in Upper Nile, with still too many old and emerging new militias around, gives all reason to be concerned. The emerging serious situation in Kordofan is not addressed at all.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in January 2005, was by no means an agreement signed by two democrats, and although paving the way for a new Government of National Unity, it did not provide a real change of power, with 52 percent majority cemented for the National Congress Party (NCP). Nevertheless the International Community (IC) was convinced the agreement would pave the way for a transformation and democratisation process in the country.

During the Abuja peace talks, the two major shortcomings of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace process were repeated, namely not to address the root causes in their totality and not to provide a process that includes all stakeholders. Headed by the African Union (AU), and supported/monitored by the IC, including the Arab League, as well as Sudan's neighbouring countries like Chad, Eritrea and Libya, the Abuja peace talks from the very beginning were further hampered by a number of factors:

- The pre-condition that by no means any provisions of the CPA should be touched
- Serious conflicting vested interests of various stakeholders
- A lack of negotiation skills - especially compared to the government - among the Darfur movements

So far, the partial signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement has not contributed to provide any fundamental rights to the people. The splits and fighting, especially along ethnic lines, give reasons for major concern. If attempts to reconcile the groups on the ground do not succeed, even more fighting can be expected in the future. The situation easily and soon will reach a state of not being “manageable” by any side any longer.

Unless the Darfur conflicts can be solved to the satisfaction of the majority of the people, they will not only be a major security concern on the ground itself, for the whole region far beyond Chad and the Central African Republic, but also for the implementation of the CPA and the peace in the South, which is extremely fragile. This connection needs to be addressed more prominently, especially as most southerners already have the feeling Darfur takes too much of the attention and money at their expense.

What exactly do the punitive measures currently discussed aim at? The NCP ruling clique has a clear answer to this: “The Westerners cheated us. First they pressured us into the CPA and promised all kind of things they never fulfilled. Then came Darfur, and they pressured us into another agreement we were not convinced about. They promised to help to get the non-signatories into the agreement, and, if

not successful, to treat them within the frame of war against terrorism. Again they did not fulfil, but instead threatened us with all kind of punitive action. In the end, this all sums up to exactly one reason: despite all promises, they want a regime change, to have easy access to our resources!"

The answer of the international community including some activists is less clear, but they at least share one point with the NCP: they also feel cheated. Again and again cheated by the NCP with "Too many agreements dishonoured", the title of Abel Alier's famous book referring to the policy regarding the south.

So: what does the IC want? Are they fed up once and for all, do not believe any longer, as one year ago, in a transition including elections provided for in the CPA, and really want a change of power as alleged by the NCP, before the elections? Do they believe the moderates within NCP can take over if the hardliners are faced with the sanctions?

How far are they willing to go? The discussed flight ban, for example, if not respected by the NCP, will imply forceful measures – possibly in violation of international law, as China and Russia are unlikely to agree to UN resolutions mandating military force. Is the IC ready for that? Whatever way one looks at it, however terrible this conclusion is, and how little "sellable" to a wider public: An immediate protection of the people in Darfur, which they would deserve, long for and which is most desirable from the human point of view, just *seems not to be possible*.

The people can only be safe, if there is:

- a. A ceasefire respected by *all* armed groups
- b. An inclusive, just and sustainable peace agreement, which fully regards the wishes and demands of the people
- c. A dialogue between all Darfurians, aiming at reconciliation and getting all militias on board.

Which lessons can we learn from the experience of two years after the signing of the CPA? Just to mention a few factors, which are important in this context:

- The south-south dialogue, as started during the war and followed until the first phase after the signing, was never followed up, and resolutions of the South-south Nairobi conference of 2005 were not implemented. Today we are faced with a situation in the south where spoilers of peace find it very easy to get people thinking there is no other way than sticking to fighting.
- There is a severe lack of a broad based dialogue about "what kind of Sudan do we really want?" During the war, most people just thought as far as up to the day of signing the agreement. Now, many just wait for the day of the referendum to come, without having a vision for the time in between, let alone after.
- Overshadowed by the Darfur conflict, the most important elements for transformation of the whole country (education about the CPA and the Interim Constitution, dialogue between governments and the people, broad based reconciliation programs, etc.) have not got the support and attention needed to make it work, despite all commitment expressed at and following the signing of the CPA.

Does all this mean that the situation is by far too complex and hopeless to find any solution? Of course not, but one has to be fully aware that no solution will come, if the complexity is ignored in order to make it easier to deal with certain aspects only. One also has to be aware that there might well be further escalation and more human suffering before things really change.

*'Terry Blue'*

*The author who appears under the pen name Terry Blue is a very experienced expert on Sudanese issues.*

## Scarcity of water may cause conflicts

The absence of water for rural communities is emerging as a major cause of conflict on the African continent. In Darfur, Sudan, the story is one of pain and desperation for the nearly two million displaced persons. And the organizations that work in the area are convinced that it is battles for water and pasture that sparked it off.

According to Ismail Algazouli, an engineer with the Sudan Social Development Organization, who attended the Ecumenical Water Network (EWN) conference in May, the conflict was triggered off by clashes over access to water and pasture between small groups of black African farmers and Arab pastoralist communities.

– The militia, who are believed to have the support of the government, would frighten off the local people. Once they fled their homes, the Janjaweed would take possession of the water points for their own livestock, says Algazouli.

The Water Conference was organized by the EWN in cooperation with the Uganda Joint Christian Council, the All Africa Conference of Churches and the Uganda-based Agency for Corporation and Research in Development and was held in Entebbe, Uganda.

Experts at the conference warn that the danger of similar conflicts elsewhere cannot be ignored. Only eight months ago, a violent conflict over land and resources was sparked off in a settlement scheme known as Chepyuk in the Mt Elgon region of Kenya.

– The conflict is around access to land and water, which is fast diminishing, says Rev. Maritim Rirei, an Anglican Church of Kenya programme coordinator in the Eldoret region. His church has been running peace programmes in the area.

Over this short period, an estimated 60,000 people have been displaced, hundreds of homes destroyed and 35 schools closed down. About 200 people have been killed and 300 arrested in government attempts to settle the conflict.

– This means that members of these displaced communities will lack access to safe and sufficient quantities of water, says Rirei.

Over the last 30 years, the population has doubled in the region, exerting pressure on the limited resources. In the same period, streams and rivers in the area have diminished in volume, forcing a community known as Soy, for example, to move up the mountain where soil is more fertile and springs are still fresh.

Rirei says that due to the visible negative impact on water sources on the mountain, the government began to resettle the mountain communities, triggering off the conflict. About 1,700 households have been re-settled, but another 5,800 are lacking land. Youth from the communities which received land have grouped themselves into a militia called the Saboat Land Defence Force, whose violent actions are destabilizing the area.

According to the peace programme coordinator, both women and children have been attacked while drawing water, or watering their animals at springs or shallow wells, forcing them to abandon their homes and seek refuge in churches and schools.

Having witnessed the impacts of small conflicts, church leaders and related organizations are worried about Africa's large fresh water masses. It is feared that the Nile waters, for example, could spark off a regional conflict, as countries attempt to pipe the water or generate development projects around it.

– We must not forget that water has always connected people and brought them together, said Danuta Sacher, head of the policy and campaigns department at Bread for the World, Germany.

The conference stated that the participation of rural communities and disadvantaged communities at all stages of intervention on water issues is not only a democratic imperative, but also a precondition for sustainability and a prerequisite for peace.

In a final statement, the conference participants affirmed that to settle conflicts solutions need to be sought together with affected populations, and be based on mutual respect for the right to water of all people involved. They warned that much will depend on the willingness of governments to deal openly and fairly with water issues, prioritizing the rights of the poorest and most vulnerable people, and exploring ways for peaceful collaboration and sharing among and within states. (WCC)

## **Faith leaders back call for boost to anti-HIV/AIDS spending**

A grouping of religious leaders living with or affected by HIV and AIDS has endorsed a campaign that calls on the US administration to increase its spending on the global fight against HIV/AIDS to US\$50 billion for the period from 2009 to 2013.

– We are delighted to hear that [US President George] Bush has pledged US\$30 billion to be spent on HIV/AIDS relief, especially in Africa. We recognise this is not enough if we are going to meet the millennium development goals, said the Rev. J. P. Heath, General Secretary of the International Network of Religious Leaders Living with or Personally Affected by HIV and AIDS.

The network, meeting in Nairobi 11-15 June, became one of the latest groups to back a 10-point Global AIDS Alliance plan that calls for changes in the approach of the United States to HIV/AIDS. (Nairobi, ENI)

## **Donors fail to fulfill pledges to help Africa**

Three years after pledging to double aid for Africa and to provide new opportunities for African exports, donor nations are falling behind in fulfilling their promises, according to a statement released by the World Bank on Sunday.

With Africa's economic prospects high on the G8 agenda, the World Bank noted that despite the 2005 Gleneagles Summit, which resulted in pledges to increase Africa's development aid to 50 billion dollars by 2010, foreign assistance for development programs in many African countries remains essentially flat. Meanwhile, the faltering trade talks under the World Trade Organization's Doha Round have been another disappointment.

Overall, the lagging resource flows come on top of an earlier decline in African assistance: excluding debt relief and emergency food aid, assistance to sub-Saharan African fell by 2.1 percent in real terms from 2004 to 2005. According to estimates in the World Bank's 2007 Global Development Finance report, net official flows of aid and debt to African countries dropped to 35.1 billion dollars in 2006 from 35.8 billion dollars the previous year.

– The record so far indicates that apart from debt reduction, African countries haven't realized the benefits promised at the G-8 Summit three years ago, during the Year of Africa, said John Page, the World Bank's Chief Economist for the Africa Region.

– Many donor countries have increased support for special humanitarian assistance and debt reduction over four decades, but, unfortunately, this does not translate into additional resources for African countries to rebuild their infrastructure, train teachers and combat HIV/AIDS and malaria, he said.

### **Sudan:**

## **Census delayed but politically 'critical'**

A key milestone in Sudan's north-south peace process is the census, planned for November this year, but continuing logistical and political complications may lead to further delays, observers say.

The results of a 'pilot census', conducted in April, are being discussed by a technical committee, which includes the northern and southern institutions in charge,

the Central Bureau of Statistics and the Southern Sudan Commission for Census, Statistics and Evaluation.

Miriam Bibi Jooma, a researcher with the Institute for Security Studies, based in South Africa, says that the census “is critical to providing benchmark data for power and wealth sharing” under the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in 2005 between the government in Khartoum and the Southern Sudanese authorities. The results of the census will recalibrate ratios for power and wealth sharing. Southern Sudan was allocated shares in the peace deal on the basis that 28 percent of the whole population live there. Jooma also pointed out that the census was a prerequisite for nationwide elections planned for 2009 and an eventual referendum on self-determination in 2011.

Preparations may not be complete by the 14 November deadline, which is towards the end of the southern rainy season. A European diplomat said the process was “way behind”, while an international official added that the November target was “very ambitious”, and “the extraordinary challenge of full mapping coverage of all areas during the wet season, and the continued delay in funding, makes a January/February [2008] census much more likely”.

Boundaries between the north and south, and of some contested areas, such as Abyei, remain un-demarcated and politically sensitive. Even borders between smaller administrative units in Southern Sudan could be disputed.

However, Majok Bol, an IT officer with the Commission, based in Rumbek, southern Sudan, is adamant the project would go ahead. “We will be ready”, said Bol. While admitting that “some areas will not be accessible because of flood”, he said the operation was feasible if enough logistics resources, including boats, were made available.

Fifty thousand people will be involved in the census, which will divide the country into a patchwork of thousands of enumeration areas (EAs). GPS units, computers, cars, bicycles and air transport are needed to reach every area. The EAs, sometimes defined by sketch maps, need not match existing political boundaries but must not overlap, to avoid under- or over-counting.

The planned national census is a “huge challenge”, says an international technical adviser to the process. “We are trying to count every single person, but don’t have maps of the area. It’s a puzzle where you don’t have the background picture – and there are no pieces”, he said. (IRIN)

## Tutu urges tough action against Sudan

– World leaders must follow a move by the United States to impose fresh sanctions against Sudan for its refusal to allow a major United Nations-led peacekeeping force into war-torn Darfur, South African Nobel laureate Desmond Tutu told leading European lawmakers during a hearing on Darfur in the beginning of June. Tutu said he endorsed “wholeheartedly the imposition of targeted sanctions on Khartoum”.

The international community must set the Sudanese government a tough deadline to accept UN peacekeepers, disarm militia forces and allow humanitarian aid to Darfur, the former Anglican archbishop and anti-apartheid struggle veteran said. He also said that China, the biggest buyer of Sudanese oil, must be pressed to raise its voice against the Sudanese government.

Echoing Tutu’s views, key members of the European Parliament called for a boycott of the 2008 summer Olympics Games in China if Beijing did not stop economic and political support for Khartoum.

– The only way to influence China is to threaten the Olympic Games, he said.

In 2005, China used its veto power in the UN Security Council to block sanctions against Sudan. Its arms exports to Sudan raised international ire further.

Tutu said the international community should ban Sudanese ministers and senior officials from travelling, and impose an embargo on their funds. He urged the EU to stop its companies from operating in Sudan and to impose a no-fly zone over Darfur.

Tutu pointed to the role international diplomatic and financial pressure played on ending apartheid in South Africa in 1991.

– Sanctions were a very important weapon for us, Tutu said. (Mail and Guardian)

**Note from the editors:**

*On June 12, the Khartoum regime agreed to allow a joint peacekeeping force comprising UN troops and African Union forces into Darfur. Noureddine Mezni, a spokesman for the African Union, called the announcement "a breakthrough moment".*

**Uganda:**

**Fair, credible prosecutions crucial to justice and peace**

Any proposed alternative to International Criminal Court (ICC) trials for the most serious crimes committed in northern Uganda must include fair, credible prosecutions accompanied by penalties that reflect the gravity of the crimes, says Human Rights Watch.

Peace talks between the Ugandan government and the rebel Lord's Resistance Army have been taking place in Juba, the regional capital of southern Sudan, on and off since last July. Resumed talks are expected to take up issues of accountability and reconciliation.

In a memorandum directed to parties involved in the peace talks, Human Rights Watch details benchmarks that must be met for any national trial to be an appropriate alternative under the ICC's Rome Statute and international human rights standards. Human Rights Watch said that prosecutions for the most serious crimes, along with broader accountability measures for lesser offenses, are essential to ensure justice and a sustainable peace.

**Action against violent religious group**

Church leaders in Kenya have condemned violent acts by a traditional religious group known as Mungiki (Multitude), blamed for a series of bizarre killings in the East African country. They have urged the government to take decisive action to root out what they say is a dangerous cult.

– We condemn in the strongest terms all the killings and the destabilisation of civilians, said Anglican Archbishop Benjamin Nzimbi. We all want to live in peace. (Nairobi, ENI)

**RESOURCES AND LINKS**

**Uganda**

**Court cases against LRA leaders**

To view the Human Rights Watch memorandum, "Benchmarks for Assessing Possible National Alternatives to International Criminal Court Cases Against LRA Leaders," please visit:

<http://hrw.org/backgrounder/ij/icc0507/>

*From the contents:*

- The importance of credible prosecutions in accordance with international standards
- Benchmarks for assessing possible national alternatives to ICC cases
- Determining the sufficiency of a national alternative to ICC prosecutions
- A note on possible Security Council deferral of an ICC investigation or prosecution

## Sudan

### **Amnesty International Sudan Report**

The Sudan entry in the Amnesty International Annual Report takes up a number of serious issues, for example violence against women, violence against demonstrators, curtailed freedom of expression and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments and torture.

<http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/Regions/Africa/Sudan>

### **Sudan: Recent Developments**

A British House of Commons Library paper on Sudan. Standard Note: SN/IA/4084

Author: Jon Lunn, International Affairs and Defence Section

*From the contents:*

#### A. The Current Situation

1. North-South
2. Darfur
3. Eastern Sudan

#### B. Conclusion

[http://docs.google.com/View?docid=dgcj6bwh\\_0hr463z](http://docs.google.com/View?docid=dgcj6bwh_0hr463z)

### **The Eastern front of Sudan**

The armed conflict in eastern Sudan is not unique. It shares marked similarities to conflicts in southern and western Sudan and like them it is a product of marginalization, uneven development, and the domination of the Sudanese state since independence by riverine-based elites.

A Small Arms Survey entitled "The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization" by John Young is found at [www.smallarmssurvey.org/](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/)

### **Comprehensive peace in Sudan**

#### ***Peace by piece: addressing Sudan's conflicts***

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was hailed by some as the dawn of a new era for Sudan. However, the country has a number of interlocking conflicts that cannot be fully addressed by a bilateral agreement. The CPA is just one part of a piecemeal approach to resolving Sudan's conflicts.

The full text is available on

[www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/contents.php](http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/contents.php)

Also available online: Accord Policy brief on Sudan

[www.c-r.org/resources/policy-briefings/sudan-policy-briefing.php](http://www.c-r.org/resources/policy-briefings/sudan-policy-briefing.php)

### **Sudan: Implementation of Peace Agreement**

#### ***UN Strategic Framework in Support of Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement***

This document represents a combined UN Strategic Framework to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Framework is intended to reinforce the complementarity of UN partners and ensure a more unified approach to commonly agreed goals and objectives.

<http://groups.google.co.za/group/sudan-john-ashworth>

### **G8 statement on Sudan**

"We, Heads of State and Government of the G8, gathered in Heiligendamm, express our deep concern that the situation in Sudan continues to be marked by conflict and strife. While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (...) has led to an end of hostilities in the South, a persistent delay in the implementation (...) is threatening to undermine efforts aimed at creating a united, peaceful, and prosperous Sudan."

The full statement is found on the following website:

[www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article22303](http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article22303)

## General

### African voices at the G8

At the G8 Summit in Germany, the spotlight was once again on world leaders to see if promises that were made in 2005 have been kept. AfricaVox's team of award-winning journalists from Ethiopia, Uganda, Mozambique and South Africa were among the few African journalists to attend the Summit. This website allows readers to know about the reactions of people in Africa directly affected by decisions made at the G8.

[http://panos.blogs.com/africavox2007/2007/05/africavox\\_heads.html](http://panos.blogs.com/africavox2007/2007/05/africavox_heads.html)

### The Americans Have Landed

A few years ago, with little fanfare, the United States opened a base in the Horn of Africa to kill or capture Al Qaeda fighters. By 2012, the Pentagon will have two dozen such forts. This is the story of Africa Command, the American military's new frontier outpost.

Find this article written in the magazine Esquire by Thomas P.M. Barnett at: [www.esquire.com/features/africacommand0707](http://www.esquire.com/features/africacommand0707)

---

## Horn of Africa Bulletin, Volume 19, No.4, June-July 2007

### Editorial information

The media review Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) was published by the Life & Peace Institute between 1989 and 2006. The re-formatting of HAB as an e-bulletin 2007 is done in close collaboration with the Nairobi-based All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). The electronic base of HAB is LPI and the editors are Tore Samuelsson, [tore.samuelsson@life-peace.org](mailto:tore.samuelsson@life-peace.org), and Kristina Lundqvist, [kristina.lundqvist@life-peace.org](mailto:kristina.lundqvist@life-peace.org). For subscription matters contact: Selin Amirthalingam, [selin.amirthalingam@life-peace.org](mailto:selin.amirthalingam@life-peace.org). For a link to HAB and more information see [www.life-peace.org](http://www.life-peace.org)

### Editorial principles

The Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) is an international newsletter, compiling analyses, news and resources primarily in the Horn of Africa region. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily represent the views of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) or the cooperating partners, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). Writers and sources are normally referred to, although in exceptional cases, the editors of the HAB may choose not to reveal the real identity of a writer or publish the source.